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1. The Concept on Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies 
 
 
 
1.1 General Remarks 
 
 
Generally speaking, the concept of transitional justice refers to methods and 
practices states or the international community may apply in the aftermath of 
humanitarian atrocities or conflicts in order to re-establish a legal and social 
framework. Methods in this regard include both judicial and non-judicial 
approaches. Transitional justice seeks to re-establish peace and stability in 
war-torn societies by establishing possibilities for justice, reconciliation and 
democracy. 
This concept of the ‘New Law’1 was established in the late 1980’s and early 
1990’s, mainly due to political changes in Latin America and Eastern Europe.2 
The progressive rise of the international community’s awareness of the 
protection of human rights during this period can be held as an aggravating 
factor for the ascension of transitional justice as a ‘remedy’ for post-conflict 
societies. 
Nevertheless, one can argue, that the concept of transitional justice was first 
established in the early years after WWII, when high-ranking Nazi leaders 
were for the first time in history held accountable for atrocities committed 
during the darkest years of Europe’s contemporary history. 3 
Teitel therefore reckons that Transitional Justice was already established after 
WWII4. He furthermore argues in his article, to split the development of 
transitional justice into three crucial phases: The first phase, as stated above, 
in his view kicked off after WWII. The period lasted until the end of the Cold 
                                                
1
 Bell, Christine: The ‘New Law’ of Transitional Justice in Building a Future on Peace and Justice: 
Studies on Transitional Justice, Peace and Development, The Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and 
Justice by K Ambos (ed.); Berlin, 2007; p.1 
2
 International Center for Transitional Justice; “What is transitional Justice”; http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/ 
30.10.2008; especially the trials of members of the Argentinean junta and in Greece are mend here! 
3
 However, why this statement could also be denied by a couple of others will be addressed in the 
following chapters. 
4
 Teitel, Ruti: Transitional Justice Genealogy in Harvard Human Rights Journal; Vol. 16; 2005; p.1 
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War. The post-Cold War phase, he reckons, is deeply related with the wave of 
democratic transitions and modernizations that began in 1989 due to major 
geo-political changes, especially in Eastern Europe. The third phase, or 
steady-state phases, as he calls it, is associated with contemporary conditions 
of persistent conflicts and is still prevailing until today. 
But what is Transitional Justice mend to achieve and how? By far, the main 
aim was and still is establishing a new regime of stability in often fragile and 
crumbly societies. By doing so one focus has be put on strengthening the civil 
society, re-establishing the Rule of Law and state institutions, judicial 
administrative and others. Studies by scholars on the transition from 
autocratic regimes to democratic ones, including those by Samuel Huntington, 
O’Donnell and Schimiter, have all integrated the transitional justice framework 
into an examination of the political processes inherent to democratic change.5 
Methods and instruments used in this regards vary a lot and depend as well 
on the specific situation and circumstances as on the funding and support 
provided. 
Governments and the international community adopted many of what became 
the basic approaches concerning transitional justice. They include the 
following main initiatives6: 
• Criminal Prosecution: Judicial investigations of those responsible for 
gross human right violations. Usually carried out against the ‘Big Fish’. 
• Truth Commissions: Usually focus more on the victim’s perspective of 
a conflict. Have no judicial power and work on the basis of 
recommendations. 
• Reparation Programs: State-sponsored programs to help balancing the 
damages caused during the conflict. 
• Security System Reforms: Seek to transform the military, police, 
judiciary and related state institutions from instruments of repression 
and corruption into instruments of public service and integrity. 
• Memorialization Efforts 
 
                                                
5
 Huntington, Samuel P.: The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth  
Century; Washington; 1991; 
6
 supra note
 2
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In the following I will focus on the judicial approaches in the concept of 
transitional justice and will just refer to the other approaches where needed to 
complement the overall picture. It is quite obvious, however, that periods of 
transitions require more then just one method to overcome the past turmoil. 
Judicial remedies and effective governmental institutions may be the most 
obvious indicators to outline and evaluate a functioning state, but a broad 
variety of measures has to be introduced in order to ensure long-term 
amelioration. Post-Conflict societies are often earmarked by a deep miss-trust 
regarding state institutions and governmental institutions. In order to 
overcome this deep disruption affecting all layers of a state, trust and 
confidence has to be re-built. Critics might claim that international institutions 
are not per se suitable for doing so, but, as I will proof in the following, they 
provide for a sound basis and framework to encompass the situation of a 
power vacuum. 
 
 
2. Criminal law as contribution towards peace 
 
 
As discussed above, several measures have been implemented to re-build 
conflict-torn societies. One of the most controversial issues on these regards 
was the discussion, whether or not justice implies peace, or if these two 
paradigms contradict each other. In the following, I will examine this question 
and how effectively justice and truth, if brought to light after the fog of a 
conflict has lifted, leads to a stabile and reconciled society. In the chapters to 
come I will focus on this question in more detail, focusing on certain conflicts 
and compare their impacts on the society in question. 
Several attempts have been made, to set-up guidelines, how transitional 
justice has to be executed, to ensure that sustainable developments evolve.  
 
 
According to Christine Bell, transitional justice has to ensure that,7 
                                                
7
 supra note
 1
; p.3 
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• Blanket amnesties that cover serious international crimes are not 
permitted; 
• Some amnesties, however, are required as conflict-related prisoners 
and detainees must be released, demilitarised, demobilised, and 
enabled to re-integrate8; 
• Criminal proceedings for the most serious offenders, coupled with 
creatively designed local mechanisms aimed at a range of goals such 
as accountability and reconciliation, for those further down the chain of 
command and a general amnesty at the lowest level. 
 
In a U.N Report issued in 2005 by Diane Orentlicher on behalf of Secretary 
General Kofi Annan regarding the updated set of principles to counter 
impunity, Ms. Orentlicher held in Art.19 that,  
‘States shall undertake prompt, thorough, independent and impartial 
investigations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law 
and take appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in 
the area of criminal justice, by ensuring that those responsible for serious 
crimes under international law are prosecuted, tried and duly punished.’9 
 
These prohibitions on blanket amnesties for the most serious violations of 
human rights (torture, genocide, inhuman treatment and willful killing) are also 
written down in a number of ‘hard law’ treaties, such as the 1948 Genocide 
Convention10, the Convention against Torture11 (UNCAT), the Geneva 
Conventions of 1948 including the Additional Protocols, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and others. 
Some crimes, however, are furthermore defined in the statutes establishing 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the 
                                                
8
 cf. Add. Protocol II Geneva Conventions 1948; Art.5(6) 
9
 UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1; 8 February 2005. See in 
particular Principle 19; The principles define serious crimes under international law as follows: Grave 
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional protocol I thereto and other 
violations of international humanitarian law that are crimes under international law, genocide, crimes 
against humanity and other violations of internationally protected human rights that are crimes under 
international law and/or which international law requires states to penalise, such as torture, enforced 
disappearance, extrajudicial execution and slavery. 
10
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; Dec. 9
th
 1948; 
11
 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment; June 26
th
 1987; 
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Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) and in the Rome Statute, establishing the International 
Criminal Court. Especially the ICTY statute provides for new definitions of 
some criminal conducts, such as rape, and was the first international legal 
institution, which accepted that rape might be used as a method of genocide. 
 
2.1 The Rule of Law 
 
The Rule of Law, as means bringing back judicial and legal standards to 
societies, is normally understood as to be an ideal that provides both justice 
and order as well as individual freedoms and social stability.12 
The Rule of Law dictates that all people in one society obey to the 
constitutional procedures and solve conflicts in accordance with the law. The 
lack of an effective judicial systems and the missing of a constitutional 
framework, which is often predominant in post-conflict societies, usually 
provides for no effective remedies for criminal conducts and therefore cannot 
provide a secure social environment for an evolving society. However, 
international intervention in the form of transitional justice can provide guiding 
principles in this regard. The establishments of the ICTY and ICTR in 1994 
were both mend to provide a link between a conflict resolution and the Rule of 
Law. Furthermore aimed the Security Council (SC) with the establishment of 
the two sister-tribunals, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to 
contribute peace and reconciliation in the regions concerned. They were 
expected to contribute to making, keeping or building peace in law-broken 
societies by implementing legal standards.13 Both tribunals, seen as historic 
experiments, derived from the belief that international justice leads to 
international peace. Alongside the same argumentation the ICC followed the 
to tribunals in 2001 as a permanent player in this respect.  
 
It is mainly accepted, that psychologically, justice is necessary to heal 
traumas and old wounds, which is needed to reach reconciliation and 
                                                
12
 Shinoda, Hideaki: Peace-building by the Rule of Law: An examination of intervention in the form of 
international tribunals; 2001; p.2; accessible under http://www.theglobalsite.co.uk (March 2008) 
13
 ibid.  
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peace.14Politically, a failure to carry out justice may undermine the legitimacy 
and credibility of the post-conflict government and encourage future failings.15 
Despite, however, strong arguments in favor for post-conflict justice (PCJ), 
some might argue, that the threat of an international trial is highly unlikely to 
deter perpetrators in ongoing conflicts. 
But in what sense are they said to contribute to peace? Are they necessary 
and useful instruments to maintain peace and is it always the case that 
pursuing justice solidifies peace?16  
As some authors argue, it would be from greater importance to grand wide-
raging amnesties and exiles during ongoing conflicts, which make 
perpetrators immune to post-conflict prosecution. By doing so, the 
government would create a stimulus for rebels, to lay down their weapons and 
stop future atrocities.17 
However, as many scholars argue, PCJ manifested in legal and political 
justice will contribute to sustainable peace, but there are many problems 
associated with carrying out justice in post-conflict societies.18  
 
 
2.2 Definitions 
 
But before we even speak about peace and justice as a possible result of 
transitional justice approaches, we should define the terms in this context. 
According to Johan Galtung, peace simply is the absence of organized 
violence. This minimalist approach, however, is different to a structural and 
cultural peace, which lays the foundation for reconciliation amongst former 
disputed people. In this context, peace should be defined as structural, 
cultural and political peace in the absence of injustice or repression. 
                                                
14
 Gates, Scott: Post-Conflict Justice and Sustainable Peace; Paper presented at the annual meeting of 
the American Political Science Association 2007; p.1 
15
 ibid. 
16
 It should be held that the rule of law in the context of international criminal tribunals does not mean 
(re-)establishing a domestic legal order, but principally describing a method to prosecute and punish 
war crimes under international law and to end a ‘culture of impunity’. 
17
 Gates, Scott et al.: Post-Conflict Societies and Sustainable Peace; World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 4191; 2007; p.1;  
18
 supra note 
11
; p.2 
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Justice on the other hand is more difficult to define. Several attempts have 
been made to clarify the term in this context; some of those should be 
discussed: 
One of the main critique points regarding the Nuremberg trials was that the 
justice implied by the Allied powers was simply victor’s justice, since the court 
was established solely by the allied powers and was not backed by a vast 
majority amongst German people.19 
Political justice, as Elster describes it, is justice against the conflicts loosing 
party.20 This is not distributive justice, however, which entails addressing the 
underlying cause of conflict e.g. social, political or cultural injustice.21 
Retributive Justice, as a concept embedded in the area between victim, 
perpetrator and society, seeks to reconcile amongst those parties, to both 
prevent future violence and sentence the wrongdoing.  In my further 
explanations, I would like to use this definition of justice, as it seems to be the 
only definition providing the fundamental elements for sustainable peace and 
reconciliation. 
 
 
2.3 Retributive Justice 
 
Retributive Justice has received the most attention in post-conflict societies. It 
claims to punish perpetrators and to hold them accountable for their 
misbehavior and wrongdoings. By carrying out such prosecutions national and 
international courts appear to be the appropriate instrument. The most 
important thing concerning the judicial justice process is, however, that the 
trials do not become a show trial, meaning that judicial mechanisms are 
misused as political orchestrations. Furthermore it is necessary, in the case of 
PCJ, to lock perpetrators out of public service jobs to publicly show that 
wrongdoings are not being ignored or accepted.  
 
                                                
19
 I will discuss the other criticism regarding the trial in the following chapters in far more detail. 
20
 Elster, Jon: Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective; Cambridge; 2004; 
p.135 
21
 supra note 
11
; p.2 
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The psychological impact of justice on peace and reconciliation is 
nevertheless disputed. Some argue, that criminal trials open old wounds 
instead of supporting the process of healing, forming greater resentments 
among former participants in civil conflicts22, while others suggests that trials 
lead to the individualization of guilt, what reduces the collective incentive for 
forgiveness.23 More importantly, however is the argument, that victims, who 
lost their faith in the judicial system of a state, regain confidence and trust 
from the break with the past and by seeing those tried most responsible for 
injustice. Failing to deal with past atrocities may also reduce the government’s 
liability and legitimacy and prevent further stabilization. If victims of war or 
former dictatorships gain the impressions that wrongdoings were not 
sufficiently prosecuted, they might be tempted to use private justice as an 
instrument for personal compensation. 
 
 
2.4 Theoretical Perspectives 
 
Especially since the Second World War many attempts have been made to 
put international criminal tribunals into a common political theory. The main 
theoretical approaches concerned Realism, Constructivism and Neo-liberal 
Institutionalism. But rather then applying these approaches as fully 
constructed theories or antagonistic concepts, I want to point out their 
different approaches very briefly and use them in a complementary way for 
my work. 
 
 
2.4.1 Realist Theory 
 
In realist theories, states are seen as the main actors on an international level. 
Furthermore it is assumed that individuals and states alike are rationalist, self-
seeking beings. Realists take the view that no global government exists and 
                                                
22
 Long William & Peter Brecke: War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotions in Conflict 
Resolution; Cambridge; 2003; p.68 
23
 Fletcher Laurel & Harvey Weinstein: Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of 
Justice to Reconciliation in Human Rights Quarterly; p.573-639; Vol.24; 2002; p. 575  
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that the world of international politics is therefore characterized as a constant, 
anarchic struggle amongst states. The only possibility to deal with this 
‘lawlessness’ on a global scale is to create a balance of power that 
emergence from the confrontation of states. States affect each other by using, 
or threatening to use, coercive power defined in material (military and 
economic) terms.24 
For a realist approach, international organizations stand as a proxy for 
national states in their competition with each other, but they are not 
instruments to create a global order or regime.25 It would make little sense for 
states to sacrifice sovereignty to enforce international laws against genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes, unless to do so would confer some 
relative advantage or to oppose it would entail some relative costs.26 
Therefore it is likely to understand, why realists would seek to limit the powers 
of an international criminal court in order to retain their own freedoms. This 
view might explain the ongoing opposition of some of the major countries 
towards the ICC. 
 
2.4.2 Neo-Liberal Institutionalist Theories 
 
Institutionalist theories overlap with the assumptions of realist theories in 
many ways, though they differ in many crucial points. Classical liberals 
believed in the idea of progress, human goodwill, and the (rational) 
perfectibility of mankind through collective institutions, in order to escape the 
state of anarchy. Neo-liberal institutionalists combine this liberalism with 
realist approaches. They still share the realist assumption that states are the 
predominant international actors but argue that states can develop incentives 
to co-operate for improvements in their own interests. Through the 
implementation of such co-operations and organisations, a certain level of 
regulated international behaviour can be reached.27  Such a regime could 
create areas of international interaction, regulated by laws, which would 
                                                
24
 Schiff, Benjamin: Building the International Criminal Court; Cambridge; 2008; p.179; 
25
 Bloxham, Donald: Beyond ‘Realism’ and Legalism: A Historical Perspective on the Limits of 
International Humanitarian Law in European Review; p.457-470; Vol.14; 2006; p.462; 
26
 supra note 
20
; p.180; 
27
 ibid. p.41; 
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impose certain legally binding obligations amongst states. Liberal 
institutionalists furthermore acknowledge that other actors than states, such 
as international organizations, NGO’s and civil societies, can affect states. 
Thus, states’ objectives are defined, at least partially, by internal political 
forces such as interest groups and political parties, and not just imposed by 
realist assumptions arising from a structurally determined national interest.28 
Neo-liberal institutionalists argue that states will support co-operation with 
international organisations, if it produces absolute or relative advantages. If 
they see co-operations damaging their interests, they will oppose, constrain, 
or defect from them. Thus, if the ICC assists in implementing states’ 
normative objective of countering impunity, it should receive continued or 
increasing support.29 For institutionalists the assumption prevails that the 
more the ICC can serve states’ interests, the more support it will acquire in 
terms of credibility, legitimacy and state support.  
 
2.4.3 Social Constructivism 
 
Contrary to realist and institutionalist approaches, social constructivism builds 
up on the assumption that states behavior can flow from a variety of motives, 
including both material (power, money) interests, and normative 
commitments.30 To explain the process leading to the establishment of the 
ICC, constructivists would argue that developments in areas such as human 
rights law have emerged since WWII and consequently led the approach to 
put an end on impunity. Furthermore, the continued increase of coverage of 
human rights laws, led to a change of states identities. Social constructivism 
seeks to explain geo-political developments in a socio-historic context. 
Therefore, not anarchy driven assumptions but more rational approaches 
enhance political changes. Constructivists argue that international institutions 
embody normative commitments that denote personal, national, and global 
                                                
28
 Schiff, Benjamin: The U.S. will learn to love the International Criminal Court; (unpublished) 2007; 
p.9 
29
 Schiff, Benjamin: Building the International Criminal Court; Cambridge; 2008; p.181; 
30
 supra note 
24
; p.10; 
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identities.31 For constructivists the creation of the ICC could highlight a 
significant change of the historical system in a way that collectively, without 
obvious gains and for apparently non-material reasons, states committed 
themselves to co-operate with an international organization, which serves the 
purpose to prosecute collectively deemed acts whose prosecution had 
previously been considered, if at all, on an ad hoc basis. For states, such as 
the United States, who still strongly oppose the ICC, pressure from human 
rights activists could lead to an adoption of the court’s jurisdiction.  
 
 
3. Assumptions 
 
In my thesis I would like to focus on special questions regarding the field of 
transitional justice. Before applying those assumptions on selected 
courts/tribunals and conflicts, I would like to form a theoretical framework and 
set up certain standards to verify the actual impact that PCJ had on the 
society in question. 
  
Main assumptions: 
• Post-conflict trials, through creating a historic record, will lead to a 
stable and more durable peace in a democratic post-conflict society; 
• Granting blank amnesties lead to the reduction of the post-conflict 
peace period by establishing a regime of collective innocence; 
• Criminal proceedings help to expose violent regimes for what they are 
and help to stigmatize and diminish them; 
• The removal of key political figures from power supports the 
emergence of more moderate political influences; 
• Providing effective remedies for victims, helps to end cycles of revenge 
and ultimately leads towards reconciliation; 
• By individualizing guilt, a regime of collective guilt is prevented and 
social healing can occur on the mid- and long-term; 
                                                
31
 supra note
 20
; p.192; 
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• Criminal prosecutions cut a clear break between past and present 
political regimes and help to legitimacy a new democratic government 
and supports the re-establishment of the Rule of Law 
 
Those assumptions build up the general framework I would like to focus on 
during my research. Even though, I will not be able to either verify or falsify 
each single one regarding every tribunal, I will try to create a sufficient and 
clear overall picture. 
 
 -12- 
4. Genealogy of Transitional Justice - a very brief history 
 
 
4.1 The Nuremberg Legacy 
 
The aftermath of the atrocities committed during WWII gave way to the first 
approaches regarding transitional and international criminal justice. By 
establishing the International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg (and Tokyo), the 
victory powers, for the first time in history, held senior officials accountable for 
crimes committed during times of war. However, this was not the idea 
intended by the victory powers from the beginning.  
Stalin, for example, when asked, how to deal with Germany and the Nazi-
leaders, answered, that in his view, it would be fair to pick 100.000 random 
German soldiers and execute them, U.S President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
joked that 49.000 would do as well. Churchill’s response towards that 
proposal was rather skeptic. In his view, as he already declared in the 
Moscow Declaration of 1943, the only possible way to deal with those 
responsible, was putting them on trial.1 
After this issue being clarified, the victory powers unanimously held, that 
putting the former German leaders on trial would be the best way with regards 
to de-Nazification, nation building and reconciliation amongst Europeans and 
Germans alike. However, many discussions arose, which would be the best 
forum to try those people. First of all the question was, whether to establish an 
international or national tribunal. After the lessons learned in the aftermath of 
WWI, when German courts established to try selected war criminals turned 
out to be a farce, the international community decided to create an 
international tribunal.2 
So it became clear fairly quickly, that an international criminal tribunal was the 
only adequate way to deal with the accused.  
                                                
1
‘Das erste Weltgericht’ in Die Zeit; 48/2001; accessible under 
http://www.zeit.de/2001/48/Das_erste_Weltgericht.htm  
2
 The so called ‘Leipziger-Trials’ were initially established under pressure from England, France and 
the U.S. in Germany to deal with the most serious crimes committed during WWI. The trials were held 
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This approach marks the incorporation of transitional justice and international 
criminal justice alike. I will discuss the Nuremburg trials, its establishment, 
rules of procedure and influence on post-Nazi Germany in far more detail in 
the following sections. 
 
4.2 The Cold-War Dilemma 
 
After the time of euphoria about finally establishing a working regime dealing 
with war criminals amongst the international community, the situation changed 
rapidly for the worse in the years to come. In the shadow of the Cold War and 
its mutual blockings on an international level between the U.S and the Soviet 
Union, further attempts to create a working global regime of transitional justice 
and to draft a U.N document marking the basis of any further trials, were 
stopped. However, the impact on the trials was still capable during the 
negotiations leading to the signature of the 1944 Geneva Conventions.3 
 
4.3 The Establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals  
 
After the end of the Cold War and in the face of the crimes committed in the 
Balkans during the war in the 1990’s, the international community realized, 
that it was time to act again. By establishing the sister-tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, situated in The Hague and Arusha, the discussion of 
international criminal justice and transitional justice came back into the public 
focus. 
Furthermore, other attempts such as the peace and reconciliation 
commissions in the Republic of South Africa, established after the Apartheid-
era, and elsewhere supported the idea of transitional justice as a means of 
sustainable peace building in post-conflict societies. I will continue on this 
issue as well in the upcoming chapters in more detail.  
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5. Typology of International Criminal Tribunals  
 
 
5.1 The Past, Present and Future 
 
In order to identify the impact of criminal tribunals on post-conflict societies, it 
is important to look at their past, present and future. 
From its very beginning international criminal tribunals were affiliated with 
international conflicts. The emerging concept of transitional justice, however, 
put them in correlation with peace building, which was rather new.4 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials are often referred to as predecessors of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and 
the newly established International Criminal Court. 
The two ad hoc tribunals established a framework of international criminal 
responsibility based on the so-called ‘Nuremberg Principles’. However, 
despite all its similarities between the ICTY/ICTR and the Nuremberg Trials, 
there are many significant differences. First, the Nuremberg tribunal can 
clearly be stated as semi-international, despite the fact, that its establishment 
was not backed by the international community as a whole, just by the victory 
powers, whereby the ad hoc tribunals established in 1994 can truly be seen 
as internationally, due to their form of creation under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charta. 
One point often raised in this regards was that the Nuremberg trials did not 
create a regime of international or global justice, but victors’ justice (I will 
come back on that point at a later point in more detail). In contrast, the ICTR 
and ICTY are often referred to as dispensing ‘Victim’s Justice’.5 
Another point worth focusing on is the fact that for the first time in history a 
true international prosecutor is bringing claims against the defendants at The 
                                                
4
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Hague and Arusha, while at the military tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo 
each participating state had its own national prosecution services. 
Furthermore, focusing on the scope of the present tribunals in comparison 
with their ancestors, it can be stated that their jurisdiction is less narrow and 
limited regarding its application. The past tribunals were limited not only 
because the victors alone controlled the tribunals, but also because the 
tribunals had no formal authority beyond war participants. The parties to the 
tribunals were also parties to the war.6 
The differences, however, between the ad hoc tribunals and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) are far more obvious. First of all, and in my view most 
importantly, stands the fact that the ICC was established as a permanent 
court. Secondly, the ICC was created through a multilateral treaty and does 
not have overriding powers over states jurisdiction on the first hand, even 
though the court has jurisdiction over a person, if the national state of the 
accused or the state, where the crimes occurred is party to the Rome 
Statute.7 On the other hand the ICC will have no binding jurisdiction over 
states not party to the statute.8  
The scope of the ICTY and ICTR is, generally speaking, more limited then the 
one of the ICC. The ICC has no territorial or temporal delimitation as the ad 
hoc tribunals do.9 However, the ad hoc tribunals being established by a SC 
resolution10 under Chapter VII UN Charta have far-reaching powers in regards 
of e.g. non-compliance of a state. The enforcement powers of the SC always 
reside behind their activities. The ad hoc tribunals are concerned with specific 
criminal conducts, but exercise almost universal powers. The power, however, 
is not perfectly universal, since some states are not recognized as members 
of the UN yet. Still cooperation is obligatory for most states in the world.11  
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The reason why the ICTY and ICTR have so far reaching powers and almost 
universal compulsory jurisdiction is due the fact, that the SC in its resolution 
considered the situation in the Balkans and in Rwanda as a ‘threat to 
international peace and security’. The SC held that ‘the prosecution of 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law` 
would ‘contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace’ in the former 
Yugoslavia and ‘to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration 
and maintenance of peace’ in Rwanda.12 This specific link between peace and 
justice in times of military intervention was missing at the Nuremberg trials, as 
well as in the Rome Statute. 
The ICC furthermore seems to be more inclined to be a genuinely judicial 
organ in comparison to its ad hoc predecessors since there is no genuine link 
to ‘peace’ in its statute.13  
 
In Art.13 and 16 of the Rome Statute the SC nevertheless has the possibility 
to use the ICC as a tool comparable with the ICTY or ICTR. In Art.13 and 16 
of the Statute legal mechanisms are provided to use the ICC in operations 
directly linked to peace in conflict-ridden areas as a tool for Chapter VII 
resolution enforcements.  
 
 
5.2 Three Philosophical Perceptions of Tribunals 
 
 
The achievements of the two ad hoc tribunals can truly be considered as 
significant in the area of international criminal law and transitional justice.14 
However, the raison d`etre of the two ad hoc tribunals is their contribution and 
maintenance towards peace, which is inherent to their served purpose. The 
main aim of the two tribunals must be first and foremost to contribute justice in 
the first instance. This might collide with its contribution towards peace and 
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reconciliation.15 The ambitious nature of the ad hoc tribunals concerning the 
nexus between justice and peace raises philosophical issues: 
• Does justice consequently contribute towards peace? 
• Is it true that the idea of natural harmony of peace and justice is a 
groundless and even dangerous assumption in international 
relations?16 
 
Hideaki Shinoda proposes three different approaches in this regard 
concerning the relationship between peace and justice in international criminal 
tribunals, past and future: ‘harmonious’, ‘adversarial’ and ‘conditional’ 
position.17 
 
5.2.1 Harmonious Position 
 
For this conceptual framework Shinoda argues that justice should not be 
understood as opposing peace. He strongly emphasizes the interrelationship 
between both. Richard Goldstone, the ICTY’s first prosecutor held, that `we 
have had illustrated the political approach which subscribes to the view that 
peace is more important and should be achieved if necessary at the cost of 
justice, and, on the other hand we have the approach from the view of the 
victim. In my opinion, it is the victim who is too often and too frequently left out 
the equation and left out of account’.18 
 
Shinoda furthermore emphasises the genuine link between peace and 
justice.19According to him endurable peace is highly connected to justice and 
its contribution in war-torn societies. He points out that the aim of justice 
should include the exposure of truth by avoiding the establishment of 
collective guilt, public and official acknowledgments towards victims, accurate 
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and faithful recording of history, curbing criminal conduct by implementing 
efficient criminal justice, and revealing a systematic pattern of gross human 
rights violations.20  
  
5.2.2 Adversarial Position 
 
The adversarial position does not build up on such a positive link between 
peace and justice. Far from that, this position claims that an excessive pursuit 
of justice undermines the basis of sustainable peace. The priority of politics 
over law is crucial in this context. Stephen Krasner, a prominent political 
scientist in this regards, in an article in the International Herald Tribune held 
that, after the Clinton administration signed the Rome Statute, the ICC is ’the 
wrong instrument for dealing with large-scale war, devastation, destruction 
and crimes against humanity’ and emphasized that ‘developing stable 
democratic societies and limiting the loss of human life require[s] prudent 
political calculations, not judicial findings. Judgements about individual guilt 
can point in one direction, and judgements about political order and promotion 
of peace and democracy can point in another’. 
Krasner, however, acknowledges the positive effect of the judicial process ‘if 
they are conducted through national, not international, tribunals, and if they 
are designed to elicit the truth, as South Africa’s was’. He furthermore points 
out that ’criminal prosecution is pressed without consideration of political 
realities, the search of justice could hinder democratic rebuilding in war torn 
nations’.21 
 
5.2.3 The Conditional Position 
 
This position reflects a mediational attempt between the two antagonistic 
positions. It still favours the establishment of international criminal tribunals 
but warns against its inappropriate use e.g. when legal implementation 
ignores the political considerations and vice versa. One representative of this 
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approach is the former US ambassador-at-large for war crimes David 
Scheffer. He was highly supporting the establishment of the two ad hoc 
tribunals and about the establishment of a permanent international criminal 
court, but opposed the Rome Statute. In an article published in 1996 he 
advocated strongly for the erection of such a court of permanent nature. He 
held that ‘the ad hoc war crimes tribunals and the proposal for a permanent 
international court are significant steps toward creating the capacity for 
international judicial intervention’.22 However, the question remains, why 
someone who is obviously in strong favour of creating an international 
criminal system voted against the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998.23 
 
 
5.3 Idealistic v. Realistic Approaches  
 
 
These referred three different approaches reflect the contradiction between 
law-orientated or politics-orientated or idealistic and realistic views. 
Furthermore they reflect the way peace and justice are understood in 
international politics. 
The realistic or Hobbesian concept of international relations sees international 
relations as an arena for constant struggles among states. Contrary to that, 
the idealistic Kantian concept builds up on a unified world of universal human 
rights.  For the Hobbesian approach, justice and order is the first value to be 
achieved. The Kantian approach, however, claims that justice subsequently 
leads to peace, because an unjust world order would consequently remain 
unstable. The Kantian thesis that perpetual peace is well secured among 
democracies is strongly denied by Hobbesians.24 
 
A third view in this concept is Bull’s middle ground position, following a 
rationalist or Grotian concept. He acknowledges the necessity of power 
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politics among states, but claims a certain regime of rules and norms covering 
that area and binding states and other actors. The Grotian view does neither 
overemphasize the necessity of power struggles among actors, nor does it 
claim for a universal jurisdiction. This position stresses to evaluate 
fundamental principles and values of an international society and use them as 
a fundamental pillar in an international society. The mutual existence of justice 
and peace and not to jeopardize the political system is the main aim of the 
rationalistic concept.25 
 
It can be noted that the majority in the international politics community more 
or less favours the Grotian approach. It favours the establishment of 
international criminal tribunals by maintaining the existing international 
political structure. However, as the idealistic approach does, it acknowledges 
the direct link between peace and justice. Overall it can be held, that the 
Grotian system seeks to establish fundamental common rules and norms by 
simultaneously keeping the international order stable.26 
 
 
5.4 The Concept of Judicial Intervention 
 
 
Since its introduction into international politics, international criminal tribunals 
were highly criticised as too time and money consuming and as not 
contributing to peace in their area of operation. However, in the following 
section I will try to point out mechanisms applied by the tribunals to fulfil their 
aim of contributing justice and peace in war-torn societies. 
 
First of all, one might raise the question, why we need international criminal 
tribunals overruling the national judicial system? The answer to this question 
is multilayered. 
First, international criminal tribunals might introduce international legitimacy 
and indictments, which often lacks in national trials. Secondly, as already 
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stated above, do conflict-ridden societies often lack of a judicial system 
suitable for dealing with crimes committed during the times of the conflict in 
question. Thirdly, international judicial systems may prevent the appearance 
of partisanship or the lack equidistance of national courts in inter-state 
conflicts.  
 
5.4.1 International Criminal Tribunals v. Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions 
 
Before pointing out the advantages, necessity and impacts of international 
criminal tribunals on post-conflict societies, we have to clearly distinguish 
them from truth and reconciliation commissions. 
Truth and reconciliation commissions as set up in South Africa, Argentina, 
Chile, Haiti, are by any means no judicial instruments in the concept of 
transitional justice. Their main purpose is to uncover the truth in order to 
achieve reconciliation and not to punish those responsible for the crimes 
committed. 
Significantly, all countries in Latin America, which established such 
commissions, were catholic-dominated countries. It is naturally assumed that 
such commissions take shape in accordance with catholic values such as 
confessions and forgiveness.27 
The commission established in the RSA seemed to follow the same pattern, 
since it aimed at disclosing atrocities during the apartheid regime, but it never 
called for punishment or compensation. 
Their principle aim is national reconciliation and therefore to make hidden 
crimes public. The idealistic approach that truth consequently leads to 
reconciliation and therefore to peace behind this concept is inadmissible. The 
element of forgiveness between the victim and the perpetrator (such as in 
retributive justice systems) is the fundament to build up anew a divided 
society. 
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In contrast, the ICTY and the ICTR are a form of judicial intervention of the 
international community into a domestic system. Even though the intervention 
by the tribunals is certainly not militarily, it still has dictatorial aspects.  
Furthermore, the intervention is not of a ‘humanitarian nature’, but it clearly 
has strong connections with humanitarian law.28 
The overall purpose of the tribunals coincides with other forms of 
humanitarian interventions with respect to humanitarian concern for victims in 
conflict-ridden areas.29 
 
 
5.5 General Advantages and Disadvantages of International Criminal 
Tribunals  
 
 
With great success comes great criticism! But what are the great 
achievements of international criminal tribunals and where lay their 
weaknesses. 
 
5.5.1 Ad hoc Tribunals 
 
As we already noted, the ad hoc tribunals are limited in both time and place of 
their jurisdictional application. However, that enables them to focus on the 
special needs required in its field of work. The UN, by setting up international 
tribunals can shape the jurisdiction and structure as it chooses.30 
Furthermore the UN can equip the tribunals with the powers necessary to deal 
with the atrocities it is dealing with and to handle these cases effectively. All 
UN members, if the tribunal is established under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charta, are required to work in accordance with the court. Moreover, because 
the tribunals are created under Chapter VII, states’ obligations to cooperate 
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with the tribunals prevail over other international obligations.31 The staff of 
such tribunals is furthermore said to be much more skilled in dealing with such 
situations then in comparison to national judges and prosecutors.32 
Furthermore, international criminal trials draw more public attention then 
national trials do, which sends a positive signal to the victims in the region. 
Another positive aspect of these tribunals is the fact that one is assured that 
international standards are met concerning e.g. the rights of the accused, 
procedural standards and the length of a trial. 
 
Disadvantages on the other hand include the enormous expense attached to 
such tribunal. Both tribunals in Arusha and The Hague are considered to 
consume about 10 per cent of the UN’s total budget per year.33 Additionally, 
the tribunals act dispatched from the region concerned, which both leads to 
more expenses and secondly hinders the work of the tribunal being easily 
monitored by the people concerned. 
 
One of the main achievements and advantages of international tribunals, 
however, is the creation of a complete conflict record. Collected in hundreds 
of hearing sessions in front of the court as well as in investigations by the 
court in the field, they provide a complete illustration of the conflict and 
anticipate the denial for certain happenings.  
 If the ICC can create this record of situations concerned is still uncertain. A 
point speaking against the ICC on this regards is the fact that the ICC is 
intentionally created to deal with the ‘big fish’ of a conflict and will therefore 
not crate a record from the bottom up, such as the ad hoc tribunals did by 
investigating first cases against minor offenders and then, when dealing with 
the offenders at the top of the command chain having already created a 
record of evidences against them. 
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6. The Nuremberg Trials  
 
 
"In untroubled times, progress toward an effective rule of law in the international 
community is slow indeed ... Now we stand at one of those rare moments when 
the thought and institutions and habits of the world have been shaken by the 
impact of world war on the lives of countless millions. Such occasions rarely 
come and quickly pass. We are put under a heavy responsibility to see that our 
behaviour during this unsettled period will direct the world's thought toward a 
firmer enforcement of the laws of international conduct, so as to make war less 
attractive to those who have governments and the destinies of peoples in their 
power." 
           - American Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson in June 1945 
 
6.1 General Introduction and Remarks  
 
The Nuremberg trials were held from 1945 to 1949 in the Palace of Justice in 
Nuremberg. They dealt with the political, ideological and economic leadership 
of the Nazi regime. The best known of these trials was the Trial of the Major 
War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (IMT), consisting of 
representatives of the victory powers, which tried 22 of the most important 
captured Nazi-leaders. The trials lasted from the 14th Nov. 1945 till 1st of 
October 1946.  
The second trials of lesser importance against war criminals were held at the 
same location. They dealt with minor offenders. Best known in this regards is 
the ‘Doctor’s Trial’ 1, against the leading medical staff of the regime, who 
faced charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
 
The trials brought up the most serious offences to a broader public through 
the medium of newsreel footage. Remarkably at that time, however, the 
response of the Allied for the horrors committed was not brute revenge, but a 
fair and public trial. Indeed, the scale of the atrocities, the desire to find a way 
to prevent such carnage in the future and the spirit of international 
cooperation that followed the Allied victory led to an approach of post-war 
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justice based, at least in theory, on the rule of law rather then the rule of 
strength.2 The new concept introduced by the IMT is truly remarkable in the 
history of International Criminal Law. The Tribunal, made up of 
representatives from each of the four allied powers, introduced a new concept 
of individual criminal accountability for crimes committed in wartimes before 
an international body. Not the German nation as a whole, as happened in the 
treaty of Versailles after WWI, but individuals were found guilty for committing 
war crimes.3 
Nineteen of them were convicted of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or 
crimes against peace. Twelve were sentenced to death.4 
As Geoffrey Robertson states, the Nuremberg Charta, trial and judgment, 
were attributable to a curious mixture of American idealism and Stalinist 
opportunism, overcoming British insistence on summery executions for Nazi 
leaders.5  
 
 
6.2 The Establishment of the Tribunal 
 
As early as 1941, Winston Churchill declared the punishment of war crimes as 
a main principle for the time after the war and in 1943. When the victory of the 
Allied powers just became a matter of time, the set up of a commission to 
gather evidence was agreed. However, the idea to actually try those 
responsible for war crimes was still in far reach. At the end of the war in 
Europe, Churchill warned, ‘all sorts of complications ensue as soon as you 
admit a fair trial’. Eden, his foreign secretary, observed that ‘the guilt of such 
individuals as Himmler is so black, that they fall outside and go beyond the 
scope of any judicial process’.6  
Lord Chancellor Simon even decided that one should revive the medieval 
concept of outlawry for German officials, a status which is imposed by a grand 
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jury on suspects held guilty for committing serious crimes who did not show 
up for trial: They could be killed by everyone, who captured them.7 
 
The British already knew about the problems that would occur in front of a 
bar. The absence of any precedent trial and the lack of a solid legal basis 
would put the trial in jeopardy of breaching the nulla poena sine lege principle 
on retroactivity. In particular this point was later raised by many critics of the 
trial. 
The US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, declared, ‘if I had my way I would 
take Hitler and Mussolini and Tojo and their accomplices and bring them 
before a drumhead court martial, and at sunrise the following morning there 
would occur an historic incident’.8 
That Hull did not have his way was mainly due to the Secretary of War, Henry 
Stimson. In a letter to President Roosevelt, he held that ‘the very punishment 
of these men in a dignified manner consistent with the advance of civilization 
will have greater effect on posterity…I am disposed to believe that, at least to 
the chief Nazi officials, we should participate in an international tribunal 
constituted to try them’. The main reason behind this proposal was that ‘a 
condemnation after such a proceeding will meet the judgment of history so 
that Germans will not be able to claim, as they have been claiming with regard 
to the Versailles Treaty, that admission of war guilt was exacted under 
duress’. 
 
Roosevelt initially wavered this proposal, but his successor Harry S. Truman 
picked up on it and appointed Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson as his 
special envoy for this issue. 
Jackson held in one of his first reports sent to President Truman: ‘To free 
them without a trial would mock the dead and make cynics of the living....but 
undiscriminating executions or punishments without definite findings of guilt, 
fairly arrived at, would violate pledges repeatedly given, and would not sit 
easily on the American conscience or be remembered by our children with 
pride. The only other course is to determine the innocence or guilt of the 
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accused after a hearing as dispassionate as the times and horrors we deal 
with will permit, and upon a record that will leave our reasons and motives 
clear.’9 
Furthermore he held that ‘the groundwork of our case must be factually 
authentic and constitute a well-documented history of what we are convinced 
was a grand, concerted pattern to incite and commit the aggressions and 
barbarities which have shocked the world. We must not forget that when the 
Nazi plans were boldly proclaimed they were so extravagant that the world 
refused to take them seriously. Unless we write the record of this movement 
with clarity and precision, we cannot blame the future if in days of peace it 
finds incredible the accusatory generalities uttered during the war. We must 
establish incredible events by credible evidence’.10 
 
Jackson saw himself confronted with the unique possibility of establishing a 
war crimes tribunal, to hold those responsible for war crimes, who had so 
often been hiding behind the paradigm of state sovereignty and state 
immunity. 
As a lawyer, Jackson understood the problems he was facing from its very 
beginning. He knew about the importance of collecting evidence to build up 
his accusations as Chief-Prosecutor. ‘What evidence? ` one might ask. ‘In a 
city where, only twenty years before, the law itself, namely the Nuremberg 
Decrees, had forced Jews into ghettos, placed them into forced labour, 
expelled them from their profession expropriated their property, and forbidden 
them all cultural life, press, theatre and schools. Just open your eyes and look 
around you!’ could be the obvious response.11 
Jackson, however, was determined to compile a record, which would not 
leave the slightest doubt about what has happened for any future generation. 
He was convinced, that ‘we must establish incredible events by incredible 
evidence’.  
The Torah itself tells us: There Grew up a generation that knew not Joseph! 12 
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The four prosecutors, during the subsequent months, brought up 100,000 
captured German documents, examined hundreds of films and took over 
25,000 pictures of what they found in Europe after the liberation, to proof, 
beyond reasonable doubt, the atrocities committed under the Nazi regime. 
Jackson, after carrying out the investigations for almost a year held, ‘with such 
authenticity and in such a detail that there can be no responsible denial of 
these crimes in future and no tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can 
arise among informed people’.13 
Furthermore, Jackson was well aware of the regime change Nuremberg 
would imply in the field of international criminal justice. He was convinced that 
the court would serve as a predecessor for any future courts and tribunals, 
following its tradition. ‘The power of the beaten path’, as Benjamin Cordoza 
calls it, was a paradigm Jackson was well aware of.  
 
Justice Jackson hoped to create a precedent that, he said, would be ‘explicit 
and unambiguous’ what previously had been ‘implicit’ in the law, that ‘to 
persecute, oppress, or do violence to individuals or minorities on political, 
racial, or religious grounds…is an international crime…for the commission [of 
which]…individuals are responsible’ and can be sentenced.14 
 
In his opening speech before the court, Jackson held: ‘The wrongs which we 
seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so 
devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it 
cannot survive their being repeated. That four great nations, flushed with 
victory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily 
submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most 
significant tributes that power has ever paid to reason.’15 
This statement Jackson gave at the very first court session represents, in my 
view, his believe in a human aspiration to do justice. When he was later asked 
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about his work at Nuremberg, Jackson, having been a member of the 
Supreme Court in the United States besides other remarkable positions he 
held during his standing long career as both academic and judge, always 
answered that this work was his greatest achievement. 
 
 
6.3 The Trial 
 
Considering the bleak alternative for the actual trial – summery executions of 
Nazi officials – that would have left their crimes committed being revealed by 
posthumous propaganda rather than in an open forum, provided a rather grim 
perspective. Even though some scholars argue that Nuremberg in fact was a 
show trial, still it served a minimum level of fairness.16 
The odds, as Robertson states, were: All prosecutors and judges were 
nationals of the Allied powers, whereby all defendants and, more regrettably, 
their attorneys were Germans.17 
The German defence lawyers quickly found themselves confronted with an 
alien Anglo-American legal regime, which they were not trained for. They 
were initially given limited access to recourses and facilities to prepare their 
cases adequately. Prosecution evidence was held back before the actual trial 
began. Those and more circumstances raised high criticism of legal scholars, 
such as Hans Kelsen, after the trials had ended. The fundamental concept of 
legality and equality of weapons were indeed infringed, but given the short 
period of time to prepare for the trials, the level of fairness is truly remarkable, 
at least in my view, but I will come back on those issues in a later point. 
 
6.3.1 Tu quoque 
 
The relevance of the tu quoque principle (‘I did it, but you did it too’, or ‘You 
did it first’) was plainly dismissed in the trials. The criticism raised by the 
accused was that war crimes committed by the Allied during the war were not 
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at stake during the trials. The judges dismissed all those claims rapidly and 
predetermined so that it was obvious that the judges were bent on silencing 
any allegations about Allied war crimes.18 
Geoffrey Robertson states that the tu quoque evidence is highly relevant to 
any assessment of whether a particular mode of warfare is justified by military 
necessity, or if sufficiently beyond the common pale to count as war crime. So 
far as the counts alleging the conspiracy to wage aggressive war and the 
commission of crimes against peace were concerned, the tu quoque 
argument was most obvious: the Germans were charged inter alia with 
violating the rearmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty which the French 
had ignored and the British had joined the Germans in circumventing.19 
Jackson was well aware of this problem. He confessed in a letter sent to his 
president that in his opinion, the Allied had done the same things the 
Germans were accused of. Indeed, the French were violating the Geneva 
Convention in their treatment of their prisoners of war, so did the Russians. 
Furthermore, he stated ‘we are prosecuting the Germans for plunder and our 
allies are practising it…we say aggressive war is a crime and one of our allies 
asserts sovereignty over the Baltic States based on no title except conquest.20  
 
The only time, the tu quoque argument was not dismissed by the court was 
during the Dönitz case. He held that while having been admiral of the German 
naval fleet, he used the same practice in the submarine war as did his 
counterpart on the Allied site, Admiral Nimitz, who was not subject to any trial, 
as well. Dönitz was therefore acquitted of this charge.21 
 
 
6.4 Nuremberg as a Milestone 
 
Despite all those failings, Nuremberg can be seen as a milestone in the 
development of International Criminal Law. Its charter for the first time in 
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history defined crimes against humanity and subsequently led to the 
establishment of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other legal instruments. 
Its rules of procedure and evidence built a legal framework all Allied powers 
could agree on.  
The emotional highlight of the trials, the afternoon when the accused were 
confronted with their wrongdoings by showing them the horrors of Auschwitz 
and Bergen-Belsen on a screen, can be held as a turning point during the 
proceedings. Some of them sweated, some sobbed or put their heads in their 
hands. Their initial defence strategy failed at that point. Even to them their 
guilt was being presented beyond reasonable doubt. Above all that, the 
accused were at this point flattered by the fairness of the trial and rose to the 
bait of making their excuses to posterity. Justice was seen to be fulfilled: the 
accused were accorded the right to defence counsel, to a trial translated into 
their own language22, to a detailed indictment and a record and copies of all 
documents related on by the prosecution. 
 
 
6.5 The Judgment 
 
In many ways the international criminal order has never been the same after 
Nuremberg. The charter itself, signed on August 8, 1945 in London, covered 
for the first time history a definition of crimes against humanity.23 The articles 
covered atrocities committed in wartime between states as well as within a 
state. Art.7 and expressively waivers the immunity of heads of state, which 
was on its own a breakthrough at this time and should not have been 
repeated until 1998, when the former President of Chile Augusto Pinochet 
was arrested in London for indictments issued by a brave Spanish judge.   
Jackson blew away the shield of state sovereignty, which helped individual 
leaders to escape responsibility by arguing that they were merely agents of an 
immune state: 
‘These defendants were men of a station and rank, which does not soil its 
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own hands with blood. They were men who knew how to use lesser folk as 
tools. We want to reach the planners and designers, the inciters and 
leaders…. The idea that a state, any more than a corporation, commits 
crimes, is a fiction. Crimes are always committed only by persons…. [i]t is 
quite intolerable to let such a legalism become the basis of personal 
immunity…. Modern civilisation puts unlimited weapons of destruction in the 
hands of men. It cannot tolerate so vast an area of legal irresponsibility.’24 
 
The tribunal rejected the argument that international law is only subject to 
sovereign states and can therefore not deal with individuals or, on the other 
hand, carry out punishments against individuals obtaining orders from a 
sovereign state. Art.8 of the Charter provides: The fact that the defendant 
acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall not free him 
from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the 
Tribunal determine that justice so requires. 
 
The proceedings ended after 216 days of actual trial on October 1, 1946. 
Twelve of the defendants were sentenced to death and seven to 
imprisonment for terms from ten years to life sentence. Three of the accused 
were acquitted. 
The Nazi leaders tried at Nuremberg were not minor soldiers further down in 
the command chain. Furthermore they were the very ones ordering and 
planning the murder of thousands of humans under the lead of a wrong 
believe.  
 
 
6.6 Criticism about the Nuremberg Trial 
 
“It would become clear in the century-run what its meaning would be”  
Justice Robert Jackson 
 
Shortly after the trials at Nuremberg were concluded, critics raised concerning 
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several issues about the trial and its procedure. Most notably in this regards is 
Hans Kelsen’s Article ‘Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial constitute a 
Precedent in International Law?’.  
 
The German reaction towards Nuremberg was rather ambivalent or even 
negative, as described by several authors. First and foremost, it was held that 
the trials were simply imposed against Germany by the Allied Powers. The 
fact alone of justice being dispensed by judges and prosecutors only from 
these four countries that occupied German soil was widely seen as a 
‘dictate’.25 
Especially emphasised in this regards was the lack of impartiality of the 
judges on the bench. No impartial country was asked to send a judge to 
Nuremberg, nor were German judges. Therefore it was not surprising that the 
Nuremberg trials were often referred to as imposing ‘Victors’ Justice’.  
 
A short time after Nuremberg, in the Tokyo Trials, the victory powers refrained 
from repeating some of those mistakes done by calling for international judges 
on the bench. However, those judges called on duty all originated from 
countries that had suffered from Japanese military activity.26   
The legal basis for the judgments at Nuremberg was also subject to an 
intense judicial discussion. Art.6 of the IMT provides the basis for crimes 
against peace, subsequently used by the court to subsume the German 
genocide committed, and the crime of war of aggression. The defence at 
Nuremberg argued that the legal basis for such corpus delicti was simply 
missing, since no statesman has ever before been convinced of having 
launched a war. So the only way to establish such a norm was through 
custom. The usual requirements to establish a customary rule in public 
international law, namely state practice and opinio iuris, were missing. Those 
two requirements were both stated in the statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) and the in the latter statute of the International 
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Court of Justice. 27 
 
The Austrian scholar Hans Kelsen especially emphasized this point. Kelsen 
raised the question, whether Nuremberg would establish a precedent in 
international law. He argued that ‘a precedent is a judicial decision of similar 
cases. In order to be a precedent, the decision of a tribunal must conform with 
certain formal and material conditions which the judgment of Nuremberg do 
not fulfil’.28 
In his view, the judicial decision must establish a new rule of law. 
Furthermore, this rule of law must be created by the judicial decision, not by 
the act of legislative organ, or by custom, or by an international treaty.29 
The IMT, especially the US Chief Prosecutor Justice Jackson, were well 
aware of this problem. It was held that the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, which 
counted Germany as on of the parties to the treaty, constitutes the legal basis 
for the tribunal’s jurisdiction. According to the pact, wars are conducted not 
only by states as abstract entities, but human beings; this also had to entail 
consequences for individuals responsible for preparing war and making the 
relevant decisions for carrying it out.30 
This, however, was far from being convincing. To declare an inter-state war 
as being unlawful is one thing, but shifting the responsibility to an individual 
criminal level is another. However, the prevailing dualist approach in public 
international law was watered down by this argument. The dualist approach 
acknowledges two separate entities in law, domestic and international law. 
Both, the subjects and application of those two entities are divided from one 
another. Public international law was seen to be the law between sovereign 
states, whereby domestic law was seen to be the legislative regime within one 
state. There was no interference. A monist approach, on the other hand, 
acknowledges that the legal system of every State forms part of a single 
system of international law and state’s own laws, with international law 
automatically incorporated into the state’s internal legal system and taking 
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precedence over purely internal laws.31 Today, scholars agree, that the monist 
approach appears to be the more convincing concept to deal with 
international legal issues. 
 
But the criticism did not stop there. It was often argued by the defense at 
Nuremberg that alleged crimes by the Allied powers during the war, fell not 
under the jurisdiction of the court. In fact, the court has been established 
solely for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European 
Axis countries. Allegation against the Allied powers for air attacks against the 
civilian population in Dresden or Hamburg during their campaign could 
therefore not be raised. 
 
Another point raised was the inconsistency of the Allied powers in dealing with 
the German population after the war. Deportation was recognized as both a 
war crime and a crime against humanity under the IMT statute. However, the 
deportations of German civilians from territories in the Czech Republic, 
Poland or Hungary were never claimed as falling under these provisions. 32 
Although it was emphasised that ‘any transfers take place should be effected 
in an orderly and humane manner’, it was clear from its very beginning that 
wild persecutions would follow and that this was clearly a case of ethnic 
cleansing.33 
 
6.6.1 The case of ex post facto legislation 
 
One of the main legal points held against the legitimacy of the IMT was the 
case of ex post facto jurisdiction. The alleged retrospective application of 
rules, on which the prosecution is based, has been discussed within scholars 
for a long period of time in national and international forums. 
The categories of crimes, namely crimes against peace, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, did, furthermore, not constitute a homogenous 
block. Some were held to be directly linked to the Briand-Kellogg pact, some 
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were not. It was therefore often referred to them as establishing an ex post 
facto regime, by retrospectively applying criminal law. However, in my opinion, 
this argument does not prevail. The 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact can clearly be 
held as a predecessor of the IMT-statute in some regards. The principles 
established in this pact clearly break the ground for the requirements of the 
PCIJ in order to establish a rule of customary international law.  
 
The violation of the proposition of nullum crimen sine lege can be denounced 
in this manner as well. The criticism of crimes against humanity followed the 
same pattern. As Tomuschat argues, the core values of the various national 
legal regimes of ‘all civilized nations’, galvanize in the core values of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes and can therefore establish a rule of custom 
as well, since both, the opinio iuris and state practice, were given.34 
 
6.6.2 Nullum crimen sine lege 
 
Historically the nullum crimen sine lege principle arose during the liberal 
movement in Europe. In its core function, it was supposed to protect the 
civilian population from random dispossession by the ruler by insisting on the 
necessity of parliamentary approval. After the Napoleonic wars this provision 
was extended to liberty rights as well.  
The main aim of the nullum crimen principle is to establish a system of legal 
confidence and predictability. Nobody should be prosecuted on account of a 
conduct, a punishable character of which he was not aware of and could not 
be expected to have been aware of, when he practised that conduct. For that 
reason, especially in criminal law, a retrospective application of a certain 
conduct was permitted.35 
In the case of crimes against humanity, as it was argued by the defence bar, 
the nullum crimen principle did not apply. As held by some scholars, there 
cannot be the slightest doubt that all the offences subsumed under crimes 
against humanity are not only objectionable from a moral perspective but 
clearly deserve to be punished and must be punished for the maintenance of 
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the peaceful coexistence of mankind as a whole.36  
The scope ratione materiae of the nullum crimen principle must therefore be 
reduced accordingly to conducts the international community unanimously 
condemns. 
Furthermore supporting this argument is the fact that in 1935 the Nazis 
themselves removed the nullum crimen principle from the German Criminal 
Code. Consequently it was argued by Justice Jackson, and more recently by 
Professor Cherif Bassiouni that the Nazi leadership forfeited their right to rely 
on this principle of law as a defence37. 
 
 
6.7 The Impact on Germany 
 
As stated above, the reaction of the German population towards the trials was 
predominantly negative. Most of the Germans got informed about the trials by 
wallpapers or the like, but were well aware of their happening. The actual 
information provided to the population about the proceedings and findings of 
the trial on the other hand was rather bad. No detailed information has been 
forwarded. So the Germans were confronted with the facts and outcomes of 
the proceedings, at a very late stage. At this point, there was no sign of 
remorse within the German population as such. The argument that British 
leaders should be held accountable as well for their bombing campaigns over 
Hamburg or other German cities was still strong and prevailing within the civil 
society.38 Whatever crimes the victors had committed were simply justified, 
rationalized or conveniently deemed irrelevant to the present case just for the 
mere fact that they were the victors. It was clear from the very beginning – 
losers could be punished, winners cannot.  
However, this negative attitude changed throughout history. In the re-united 
Germany, the reaction towards the tribunals was relatively positive, due to 
several factors I will refer later on. 
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When describing Germany’s public opinion towards anything during 1945 and 
the 1990’s, one has to bear in mind, that due to the separation of the country 
in the years to come after 1945, developments in eastern and western 
Germany contradicted each other in many ways. 
Critique raised by West Germany was merely focusing on legal issues 
(especially following the legal critic of Hans Kelsen and his emerging concept 
of Positivism), leaving political issues almost entirely aside, even though the 
motivation behind this critique was often politics. 39 On the other hand, East 
Germanys affirmation with the trials did not reveal their true intend either. 
 
For this reason I intend to split my analyses on the impact of the trial towards 
society in two parts – East and West German findings. Furthermore I want to 
take other transitional justice measures implied into consideration, as set out 
in the previous chapters. 
 
Generally speaking, until 1951, the legal justice measures imposed against 
alleged perpetrators in the post-war period were predominantly carried out by 
the allied powers. The national judicial system was incapable of dealing with 
such issues at this early stage after the war. This applied to East and West 
Germany alike. However, since all of the four victory powers had jurisdiction 
over persons in their occupied zone, the methods applied varied. Each of the 
powers exercised their legal power in pursuing different aims. Nevertheless, 
some efforts regarding the implementation of transitional justice methods 
were even made in accordance. 
 
Three of those measures shall be mentioned here: 
• The Military Tribunals at Nuremberg; 
• National War Crimes Tribunals under Control Council Law No.10;40  
• Trials carried out through a variety of domestic courts, initially operating 
under allied supervision, later independently; 
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Apart from holding perpetrators accountable, the occupying powers also 
sought to purge Germany of its Nazi leaders and its legacy. Cornerstone of 
this initiative of de-Nazification was to prepare the ground for a new 
government, through a variety of measures, both judicial and non-judicial. 
Crucial in this context was the policy to not just penalize individuals for their 
crimes committed, but also to denounce certain organisations, such as the 
SS, SA, GESTAPO and the Nazi party as a whole, as being criminal. Those 
organisations, convicted by the Nuremberg Tribunals as being criminal, had 
former members amounting to several millions. Their members could be held 
accountable without any further indictments, but just for their membership in 
the particular organisation. Convicted members were subjects to a variety of 
punishments, ranging from terms of imprisonment, confiscation of property, 
dismissal from public service, loss of businesses or fines. The allied powers 
aimed to ‘educate’ the German people as to the crimes that had been 
committed in their name, through institutions in which many of them had 
participated.41 
It was indeed highly questionable, if those measures imposed had any solid 
legal basis.42 The Hague Rules of Land Warfare of 1907 do not provide any 
legal basis for such measures to undertake. The allied powers, being well 
aware of this issue, circumvented this problem by simply declaring 
themselves as the new German government, since the predecessing 
government had been overthrown, hanged or sentenced to long terms 
imprisonment.  
Apart, however, from the international trials at Nuremberg, each victory power 
held separate trials either under Council Control Law No.10 or under their own 
national jurisdiction. 43 
Art. III of the Control Council Law No. 10 held in paragraph 1:  
Each occupying authority, within its Zone of Occupation, 
(a) shall have the right to cause persons within such Zone suspected of 
having committed a crime, including those charged with crime by one 
of the United Nations, to be arrested and shall take under control the 
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property, real and personal, owned or controlled by the said persons, 
pending decisions as to its eventual disposition. 
Furthermore, paragraph 2 of the same Art. provided: 
     (a) The tribunal by which persons charged with offences hereunder shall 
be tried and the rules and procedure thereof shall be determined or 
designated by each Zone Commander for his respective Zone. Nothing herein 
is intended to, or shall impair or limit the Jurisdiction or power of any court or 
tribunal now or hereafter established in any Zone by the Commander thereof, 
or of the International Military Tribunal established by the London Agreement 
of 8 August 1945. 
 
Beyond Nuremberg, the American authorities began in 1945 to prepare trials 
against about 2.200 alleged German perpetrators. Of those1814 were 
convicted, 450 received death sentences. British tribunals sentenced 1085 
persons (240 death sentences) and the French tried 2107 persons (104 death 
sentences). The number of people tried in Soviet courtrooms was, however, 
even higher. About 45.000 persons were held accountable for committing 
crimes as defined in the statute of the IMT.44 
 
6.7.1 Transitional Justice Approaches in Western Germany 
 
As already described, a wide variety of measures to deal with post-war 
Germany were lined out by the victory powers in the years even before 1945. 
They covered actions such as summery executions45 or the reduction of the 
German state into a rudimentary agricultural state46, which would have 
imposed collective punishment and guild to the German people. However, a 
trial, combined with other measures, which would today be subsumed under 
the regime of transitional justice, was established.  
As a consequence following the first trials at Nuremberg against the major war 
criminals, other trials took place to deal with other offenders who were either 
not at the top-end of the military command chain or who’s support for the 
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regime derived from a different source. As representatives for the German 
industry, for example, the cases against the leading group of German 
industrials, such as Krupp, Flick et.al, was brought before the court in 1946 on 
initiative of the American administration. Below this very high level of judicial 
effort, the U.S conducted 489 trials against lower level officials in subsequent 
cases. Most of the American-lead cases were held in Dachau.47 
 
A major part of American judicial resource was dedicated to hunt down and 
prosecute those, who committed crimes against American nationals during 
the war. This was similar in all national judicial approaches of the four allied 
powers. Furthermore, the Americans conducted several major trials against a 
large group of defendants, who were involved in running the concentration 
camps in Dachau, Buchenwald and Mauthausen. These cases followed the 
concept of collective responsibility for participation in a system of organized 
criminality to connect every member of the camp from the lowliest guard and 
functionary to the camp commander to all of the crimes committed in the 
camps.48 By doing so, the Americans hoped to erase any doubt in the minds 
of ordinary Germans about the criminal and destructive element in Hitler’s 
regime. The same pattern was applied by the British administration as well. 
The public interest in all those cases soon got lost. What followed accordingly 
was a significant cut in budget for those trials.  
The French and Soviet approach, however, was somehow different. Their 
approach on post-war trials was somehow determined by the mere fact of 
occupation of their soil by German troops. The humiliating defeat and the 
terror of the German occupation encouraged their governments to put more 
emphasise on prosecuting those responsible.  
 
6.7.2 Legal Critique in West Germany 
 
In the years following 1998, most German commentators refused from 
accepting the principles established at Nuremberg. The point of ‘Victor’s 
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Justice’ was highlighted as well as the previously discussed problem of nullum 
crimen. 
Few of the West German scholars accepted the IMT as being international. 
As Hans-Heinrich Jeschek put it, the tribunal was not more then an inter-allied 
court or even an occupational court.49 
At a conference of West German international law professors it was held: ‘The 
general principles of belligerent occupation, as they are enshrined in [t]he 
Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, apply 
to…Germany and cannot be derogated from the distinct legal will of individual 
states’50. The IMT’s jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and aggression 
was therefore held to be contrary to The Hague Conventions and hence being 
contrary to international law as such.’  
Some commentators furthermore criticized the court for not providing for the 
necessity of equality of arms between the prosecution service and the 
defence. They argued that access to crucial documents were not handed over 
to the defence and could not be contested before the case was actually 
presented to the court. 
Two leading defence counsels, however, concluded independently years after 
the actual trials that ‘the proceedings, the treatment of the defendants and the 
right granted to the defence were very fair and it would be untrue to state that 
the defence was restricted’.51 
 
More seriously was the critique that the IMT did not consider the crimes 
committed by the Nazi regime against the German people. It was held that the 
jurisdiction focused exclusively of crimes committed against foreigners. 
Indeed, the interpretation of crimes against humanity by the court was rather 
narrow: A crime against humanity would only be punishable under the 
jurisdiction of the court if it constituted either a war crime, or if it was 
committed in accordance with the crime of aggression.52  
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The crimes committed against German dissidents and the euthanasia of 
mentally and physically ill people was barely mentioned in the judgments. 
Crimes against the Jewish population were only considered as they were 
linked to war crimes and only in the years after 1939. 
 
6.7.3 auctoritas non veritas facit legem 
 
One of the strongest opponents, as already noted, was the Austrian scholar 
Hans Kelsen. Kelsen, being himself a victim of the Nazi regime, strongly 
argued against the Hobbesian approach of unilateral implementation of law. 
‘What really impairs the authority of the judgement is that the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility for the violation of rules of international law 
prohibiting war has not been established as a general principle of law, but as 
a rule applicable only to vanquished states by the victors’.53 
Other West German scholars were far more pejorative. Georg Dahm, 
Professor of Law in West Germany called the laws applied at the IMT ‘special 
law for the vanquished’.54 
Walter Schätzel, Professor for International Law in Bonn, held that 
‘defendants will be called war criminals, without this connoting a moral 
allegation. Everybody knows that acts of utmost patriotism and dedication 
may be considered war crimes from the other side’.55 
 
6.7.4 Nuremberg as a Political Question 
 
During the period of actual trials held at Nuremberg, there was rather small or 
even no German critique. Critical commands were only published in the years 
to come. At the beginning of the 1950’s, as the de-Nazification process put a 
firm grip on Germany, the Nuremberg principles were increasingly rejected. 
The first phase of critique, as noted above, was predominantly theoretical in 
its nature. Scholars such as Kelsen or Dahm challenged the legality of the 
                                                
53
 supra note 
26
; p.171; 
54
 Dahm, Georg; Völkerrecht; Vol.3; Stuttgart; 1961; p.292; Dahm, however, was himself being 
associated with the Nazi regime. He was prohibited to lecture in post-war Germany and therefore went 
to Pakistan in 1951. 
55
 supra note
  37
; p.806 
  
- 44 - 
tribunal. The first critical attempts, however, were not addressed in an open 
forum, but more in informal arenas. Reasons for this hesitation may have 
been: 
First, question with regards to the legality of the IMT were predominantly of a 
theoretical nature. Secondly, the more urgent issue among German scholars 
was to clarify the legal status of Germany as such, since there has never 
been a formal surrender of the German ‘Wehrmacht’. Thirdly, in the early 
years after the war, it was considered as being simply not appropriate to 
criticise the Allied trials.56 
The period following the 1950 saw a steady increase of critique. Again, three 
explanations can be given for this: 
Firstly, Control Council Law No. 10, which gave way to the subsequent cases 
following the IMT by criminalizing the same offences as the IMT statute did, 
was becoming of more importance. Control Council Law No.10 did not include 
a right to appeal (neither did the IMT statute!). The problem of the 
implementation of this law was that the very same issues, namely nullum 
crimen and retrospectivity that were held against the legality of the IMT were 
brought up against the trials under Control Council Law No.10. 
Secondly, the political climate in Germany changed rapidly. The German 
people assumed themselves as ready to draw a line under history and to start 
anew. However, the still ongoing process of de-Nazification was seen as an 
artificial barrier against this. 
In 1965, a German criminal lawyer held:  
‘For years, most German citizens made all possible efforts to forget what 
happened in twelve ill-fated years. They made their gaps in memory 
systematic, and developed the handling of these generous gaps to perfection. 
That foreign countries neither could nor would forget as easily had to be taken 
note of from time to time, yet did little to disturb the inner-German silence. 
Already the term reconciliation with the past was becoming frowned on. Of 
collective responsibility, a responsibility of the German people (not collective 
guilt), nobody wanted to know’.57 
Thirdly, the change in international political climate demanded a re-
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emergence of a strong West Germany. With the beginning of the Cold War, a 
strong democratic state was needed against the emergence of communism in 
east and south-central Europe. In the years following 1951, a new course in 
U.S politics towards West Germany was introduced. A large number of 
amnesties were granted or sentences were reduced in order to ensure that 
West Germany would stand strong as an Ally against communism. 58 As 
Friedrich held: ‘The defence of freedom no longer required Germany’s legal 
consciousness and moral remorse, but its old vigour, fighting experience, 
innovative science, artful weapons design and dynamic industry’.59 
 
6.7.5 Shaping Public Opinion 
 
Empirical evidence regarding the Nuremberg Trials was and still is rare and 
hard to find. However, some public polls, carried out by the American forces, 
were published in the years following the trials. 
During the trials, some 87% of the Germans knew that the trials were taking 
place; 80% of them considered the trials as being fair and a majority even 
assumed the defendants guilty. Additionally, 70% of the population thought 
that there were still other Germans at large, which should be held accountable 
as well. Only 6% expressed their negative attitude towards the trials after the 
final judgement and just 9% deemed the verdicts as too harsh. However, 
those polls changed rapidly in the years to come. 
In the 1950’s already 30% of the German population held the trials as having 
been unfair and 40% deemed the verdicts as too harsh. 59% of the population 
disapproved, how the Allied dealt with the defendants and 10% said that they 
approve the trials.60 
Reports on post-war Germany enhance the view that the German population 
never appreciated the work of the IMT and its subsequent trials. Large scales 
of the Western German Public were, however, never disaffected by the trials 
either. In Wuppertal, for example, schoolgirls dressed in black on the morning 
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of the execution of those sentenced to death by the IMT.61 
In the legislative time following the Nuremberg trials the German government 
passed the German Grundgesetz in 1949, which expressively in Art.103 (2) 
prohibits the application of ex post facto legislation. This strong positivist 
approach can clearly be tracked down to the developments following the IMT 
judgments. 
 
6.7.6 De-Nazification  
 
Simultaneously to the ongoing trials in Nuremberg and elsewhere in 
Germany, a second measure was persecuted by the Allied powers to re-
establish Germany after the Nazi Regime. De-Nazification, in general, aimed 
at purging Germany of Nazism and to rid the society, culture, press, economy, 
industry and politics of all remaining Nazi officials to ensure the extinction of 
any national-socialist ideological restraints. Surly, those approaches even 
included punitive aims, though only as one element in a complex set of 
policies and practices. 
The de-Nazification process, as the judicial persecution, was operated in 
different ways in all of the four occupied zones. Furthermore, during the initial 
four years after the war, policies by all Allied powers were re-shaped and 
adapted.  
Among the occupational powers, there was little unanimity apart from the 
mere fact that governmental and party leaders of the former regime should be 
removed and rendered harmless. 
The initial phase of the de-Nazification policy was intimately linked to security 
policy aspects. The establishment of full Allied control was crucial in the years 
following 1945.62 The focus clearly was on the disarmament of underground 
resistance to the Allied. For this reason, a couple of legislative measures were 
introduced by the Allied to deal with these issues. On the American side, for 
example, a military handbook was prepared, which encompassed the 
automatic arrest of individuals, who were presumed to be of a certain security 
risk. Mandatory initial arrest also applied to all former members of the 
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GESTAPO, SS, SD and SA. All in all, some 250.000 individuals fell under this 
regime. Automatic arrest warrants without a trial were applied by all 
occupational powers alike. By January 1947 some 240.000 Germans were 
either still in Allied detention or had already been released. 63 
By the end of 1948, however, only a couple of hundreds still remained 
interned in the American zone. The same applied to the British and French 
zones. All Western powers were very keen on quickly emptying their camps 
from German prisoners. In the Soviet occupational zone, however, the 
situation remained different. A large number of those interned remained in 
custody or were send to the Soviet Union for slave labour. Also interestingly, 
compared to less then 1% of the detained persons, who died in western 
custody, about one third of prisoners in Soviet detention facilities died either in 
detention or during their slave work under Soviet supervision. For the Soviet 
Union internment and retribution seemed to have gone hand in hand, not so in 
the West. 
In the Western zones, new policies occurred in the years following 1947. The 
large number of detainees subverted the economic plan of the occupational 
powers to rebuild a German society. The workforce needed to fulfil this plan 
simply clashed with the initial aim to prosecute and punish a large number of 
German citizens. Secondly, it became clear that the persons in charge for the 
crimes committed, the ‘big fish’, were not caught by this measure. 
 
Another measure introduced in 1946, apart from automatic arrest warrants to 
neutralise the former regime, was to declare the membership in former 
organizations, such as the SS and SA, as illegal per se. Six of the main 
former Nazi organisations had been declared illegal before the IMT, three of 
those were convinced being criminal. The initial aim behind this policy was 
beyond being symbolic. Especially the American forces saw themselves 
confronted with a vast number of members of organizations, such as the 
GESTAPO or SS, which were responsible for a wide range of the atrocities 
committed during and before the war. To tackle this issue and to amplify the 
‘symbolic justice’ of the IMT, the American forces planed to hold mass trials 
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for those having been members of these organizations. The above-discussed 
Control Council Law No.10 established the basis for such trials. It provided 
that ‘membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared 
criminal by the IMT’ was a crime punishable with sentences ranging from 
death to fines. The IMT, however, rejected this plan, by holding ‘that criminal 
guilt is personal and that mass punishments should be avoided’. The IMT 
thereby refused to apply a policy of collective guilt.  
The American officials were not particular happy with this position. They 
decided to somehow circumnavigate this opinion of the IMT by establishing 
national courts (Spruchgerichte) to deal with those persons. By October 1949 
these courts had tried some 25.000 members of these organizations. Almost 
16.000 were convicted and about 5.000 were sentences to terms of 
imprisonment, the rest was fined. 
In an official American report in 1952 on de-Nazification three major points 
had been lined out. Firstly, powers should be transferred to non-Nazi officials 
to enable a democratic, stable and peaceful Germany to emerge. Secondly, it 
was claimed to prosecute those responsible in such a way that the German 
public could recognize that ‘they had violated basic standards of a just 
society’. And thirdly, the report held that de-Nazification had to be 
accomplished in such a way that it did not produce instability.64 
The accomplishment of these goals was not particularly easy. To complete 
the process of de-Nazifiacation the American authorities even sent out 
questionnaires to evaluate the participation in criminal organizations and alike.  
Those huge efforts from the Americans to identify all persons, who were 
related to Nazi crimes summed up in an enormous amount of documents and 
papers. To evaluate the guilt of each of those suspects, who were held to be 
accountable on the first sight and to distinguish between the ‘real’ Nazis and 
minor offenders, a vast number of 545 national tribunals were set up. These 
tribunals were supposed to classify the accused into five separate categories: 
Major offenders, offenders, minor offenders, followers and non-offenders. 
About 190.000 persons were brought before those tribunals. At the end of the 
trials, 339 persons had been classified as major offenders, 3600 as offenders 
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and about 14.000 as minor offenders. The vast number of persons was 
declared as being a follower.65 This so-called ‘Persilschein’ enabled persons 
to be relieved of the Nazi stigma and to re-integrate socially and economically 
into the German society.66 
 
 
6.8 Developments in East Germany after 1945 
 
When looking on the developments in Eastern Germany after 1945, one has 
to bear in mind that political diversity and the freedom of speech was not 
granted in a way as it applied to its Western neighbour. Society was merely 
controlled by a small elite and political discourse had to be in alignment with 
the ruling party.  
The Soviet authorities transferred the responsibility to deal with the trials of 
minor offenders earlier to the national East German judiciary system as it 
happened in West Germany. The courts in East Germany based their 
jurisdiction as well on the above-discussed Control Council Law No.10. This 
regime, however, was implied in 1961 into national criminal law and could 
therefore be applied by any national court or tribunal in East Germany. The 
principles of Nuremberg where therefore used on a domestic level as well. 
The recognition of the jurisdiction of the IMT as having established general 
principles of international law, which subsequently found application in 
national law, can be held as a significant different to the West German 
approach.67 
A different approach is also evident in East Germanys reaction towards the 
nullum crimen issue: Under Article 153(3) of the 1949 Constitution of the 
GDR, retroactivity of criminal proceedings was explicitly granted for cases ‘to 
overcome Nazism, fascism and militarism or that were necessary to prosecute 
crimes against humanity’. 
The Nuremberg trials, nevertheless, were often used in the GDR as a political 
                                                
65
 The small number of persons convicted gave those tribunals the byname ‘Mitläuferfabrik’. 
66
 ibid.; p.11 
67
 supra note 
37
; p.816 
  
- 50 - 
instrument as well.68 Nuremberg was a ‘revolution from above’ and was 
intended to promote the anti-Nazi ideology and therefore to legitimise the 
communist rule. 
 
6.8.1 The Waldheim Trials 
 
The Easter German attitude towards the prosecution of former Nazi officials 
can best be exemplified in the proceedings against approximately 3.400 
defendants at the so called Waldheim trials, which took place in1950 in the 
city of Waldheim, Saxony. A huge number of former inmates of Soviet 
internment camps were brought before special trial chambers. The trials rarely 
lasted longer than 20 to 30 minutes. All the members of the judgment board 
were hand-picked loyal judges and party officials. Of those accused 32 were 
sentenced to death, more than 140 were sentenced to terms of life 
imprisonment. The rest received sentences from up to 25 years of detention. 
Fewer than ten were formally acquitted. In West Germany the trials were 
viewed as follows: 
‘The number of flagrant violations of due process, which make a mockery of 
any kind of regular administration of justice, leave no possibility of upholding 
the legal effects of these judgments. They are ipso iure and irremediably null 
and void.’69 
The intention behind those trials was not to bring perpetrators to justice, but to 
display the GDR’s anti-Nazi attitude. 
 
6.8.2 Developments during the initial phase of the Cold War 
 
During the period following the mass trials on both German soils, East and 
West, other issues emerged replacing the focus to punish the war criminals. 
The Cold war spreading its cast all over Europe and the rest of the world 
rapidly promoted other issues on the forefront of policies in America and the 
Soviet Union. Both countries quickly noticed that a strong Germany, equal 
West or East, was crucial to widen their influence and strength in Europe. 
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Politicians, especially in West Germany, noticed that this shift in policy put 
them in an advantage situation. They knew about their key benefits and well 
knew how to use them. 
The Adenauer administration was increasingly successful in making the 
release of German detainees a key issue for their co-operation with the West. 
The plan was to rebuild Germanys political strength as being key players in 
Europe by simultaneously overcoming their own dark legacy, for which those 
still imprisoned were a constant reminder.70 
However, a lot of politicians, especially in the U.S, had a rather critical attitude 
towards that approach. It was argued that a permission of mass releases and 
amnesties would jeopardize the efforts carried out during the last years. 
A change in German legislation in 1953 gave way to the return of some 
53.000 Germans to return into public service, after having been forcefully 
removed in the years before. The denunciation of declaring most of the 
persecuted persons as followers during the mass trials in the years between 
1946 and 1951 can be held as a supporting factor for this.  
The policy of Adenauer was clear. He wanted all German prisoners, which 
were still held in Allied custody, being handed over to the German authorities. 
Churchill agreed, but not without trying to make a bargain. Though it appeared 
clear that there was no alternative to handing over the remaining detainees to 
the German authorities. It would have made German sovereignty a mockery, 
if judicial power over their own citizens would not be granted.71 
For Churchill it was, however, clear that under no circumstances, the 
judgments of Nuremberg ought to be declared void. If convicted war crimes 
were declared void, these acts had not been crimes and had therefore never 
happened.  For the Allied it was clear that the legality of their invasion stood 
or fell with the legality of the Nuremberg judgments. At this time, even though 
having been a divided country at that time, the Germans were unanimous on 
one position: Under no circumstances would the judgments of Nuremberg be 
recognised as being valid and legal acts. 
Under Art.11 of the peace treaty with Japan, signed in September 1951, the 
Japanese government had agreed to recognise the validity and legality of the 
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Tokyo War Crimes tribunal judgments and to enforce the sentences handed 
out to the perpetrators. Germany, however, was in a completely different 
situation for the above-mentioned reasons and an agreement like this was out 
on sight. 
On December 4th, 1951 Churchill agreed to hand over all detainees remaining 
in British custody to German authorities. Furthermore it was assured that 
Germany, unlike Japan, had not to recognise the validity of their sentences.  
In 1952, an annex to the Paris peace treaty was proposed. These articles 
contained three main provisions72: 
First, a mixed board would be established to review further sentences handed 
out by German courts against alleged war criminals, but with no legal 
authority to question their validity. Secondly, a provision was included, which 
empowered Germany to take custody over war criminals. The third provision 
under section 11 of Art.6, however, declared that Art.7, which dealt with the 
validity of the Nuremberg judgments, was not applicable. By doing so, a legal 
provision to acknowledge the validity a legality of Nuremberg was 
circumvented. Nuremberg was surrendered and justice was sacrificed for 
peace and stability! 
 
6.9 Concluding Remarks 
 
Does this all mean that the transitional justice approaches failed in Germany? 
The answer to this is not simple. I would say – It depends! 
From its very beginning Allied attempts to restore justice and peace in post-
war Germany were characterised by a strong tension between legal justice 
and political goals, between political and judicial solutions. Clear is that one of 
the main goals of the Allied powers was to eliminate the Nazism legacy in 
Germany and to create a new and sustainable political order. Trials and 
punishments were just one aspect of that framework. In my opinion, the 
decision to release a vast number of perpetrators early from their terms of 
imprisonment or even without being sentenced does not mean that the trials 
have failed. As David Cohen noticed: 
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‘They did, from stigmatization of the NS regime and its highest servants, 
education of the German public as to what had been done in their name, 
criminal condemnation of thousands of perpetrators, and removal and 
neutralization of a large group of individuals during a critical period, to serving 
the discovery of historical truth and providing rehabilitative, integrative, and 
unifying mechanisms by which Germans could come to terms (however 
imperfectly and in whatever different ways) with their past and get on with the 
work of reconstruction. The irony of the failure of de-Nazification and of the 
‘re-Nazification’ of the early 1950’s was that they seem to have served the 
creation, for the first time in German history, of a stable democratic Rechtstaat 
built, above all, upon Germany’s successful re-emergence as a major world 
economic power. From this standpoint the Allied program for Germany was an 
undoubted success.’73 
Therefore the Nuremberg trials and its subsequent judicial approaches 
marked a significant change in German history and draw a clear cut between 
the years of 1933-1945 and the contemporary German political developments. 
Furthermore, the historic record created by the courts and tribunals serves 
until today as a sound basis for scholars and politicians to prevent any mal- or 
wrong- interpretation of this part of European history. 
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7. Reconciliation on the Balkans and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
 
 
7.1 The Establishment of the Tribunal 
 
After the Nuremberg Trials established following the Second World War, 
dealing with mass atrocities committed by Nazi Germans against millions of 
people all over Europe, the concept of transitional justice and criminal 
responsibility for crimes committed in times of war fell into oblivion. It took 
another fifty years to re-invent a criminal court to deal with conducts, such as 
genocide and war crimes. 
The crimes committed in the Balkans during the 1990’s, however, forced the 
International Community to act in order to bring alleged war criminals to 
justice.  The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1992 (ICTY) was established by 
Security Council (SC) Resolutions 8081 and 8272 in 1993. The SC, by doing 
so, acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charta. Due to this procedure, the 
tribunal was equipped with far reaching powers, especially regarding state co-
operation. The establishment of an ad-hoc tribunal gained inexorable 
momentum. Louis Arbour, who served as the Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal 
from 1996 to 1999 held, that the court was born ‘out of the utter despair of the 
international community as to how to manage these unmanageable conflicts 
in the Balkans’.3  
Subsequently, little after a year later, after the world community witnessed the 
genocide committed on the Tutsi minority by the Hutu majority in Rwanda in 
1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), was established. 
The ICTR was created as a ‘sister’ tribunal of the ICTY, sharing both the 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the Appeals Chamber. 
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 Rwanda, however, having by chance been an elected SC member at that 
point, voted against the resolution4 establishing the ICTR. By doing so, the 
Rwandan government wanted to express its discontent with certain provisions 
within the resolution.5  
Following the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR, many calls for the creation 
of additional tribunals, dealing with cases in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Burundi 
and East Timor, came up.6 However, these calls were subsequently ignored, 
but came back on the agenda in the following years. 
 
The creation of the two courts marks a fundamental shift in international law 
and policy. For the first time since Nuremberg, heads of state and others 
stood trial before a truly international court. As Richard Goldstone, the first 
prosecutor of the ICTY held before the Court: ‘A plea of head of state 
immunity will not constitute a defence, nor will it mitigate punishment’.7 
Geoffrey Robertson QC, a well known advocate for human rights and 
international criminal liability, even calls the establishment of the courts a 
‘deeply symbolic, if not Grotian, moment: the first sign of a seismic shift, from 
diplomacy to legality, in the conduct of world affairs’8. 
The conclusion Robertson gives is perfectly right. Even if the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials can be considered as groundbreaking for the ICTY/ICTR, their 
objectives and scopes were significantly different. The power of the ‘beaten 
path’ was yet to come. 
 
At the time of Nuremberg, Germany already lay in ruins. The aim of the 
following trials was to promote retributive justice, rather then to promote 
peace and end an ongoing conflict, as it appeared in the Balkans.9 The word 
reconciliation, which is utterly fashionable amongst scholars these days, was 
not being used at Nuremberg. The UN, by establishing the ICTY during an 
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ongoing conflict, emphasised the genuine link between justice and peace and 
concluded that the work of the tribunal ‘would contribute to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace’.10 For the ICTR, the UN SC held in the preamble of the 
resolution establishing the court in Arusha that its work would ‘contribute to 
national reconciliation’11.  
The given link between justice, peace and national reconciliation justified the 
engagement of the institutions and of the SC itself, and invalidated the 
concerns regarding the withdrawal of state sovereignty.12Furthermore, 
criticism arose amongst scholars that Chapter VII does not provide for a 
tribunal to be established. It was held that the list of remedies provided in Art. 
41 and 42 is exhaustive and does not provide the legal basis for such 
tribunals. 
 
 
7.2 Establishing the Court  
 
As the creation of an international criminal tribunal gained momentum after 
decades of atrophy, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia erupted, when states 
started to furthermore disintegrate. The concept of creating such a tribunal 
during an ongoing conflict was truly remarkable. 
But the establishment of the ICTY was not concluded by simply passing the 
required SC Resolution in 1993. Gabrielle Kirk-McDonald, the courts first 
president and former US Supreme Court Judge held: ‘When I compare my 
experience at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) with my service as a federal judge in the United States, where I had 
the benefit of an established infrastructure and staff, with rules of procedure 
and evidence and clear precedent to look to, the progress of the Tribunal is 
absolutely amazing. When we 11 original Judges met in The Hague in 
November of 1993, we had none of that. We had no premises, no permanent 
staff and, critically, we had no legal framework to guide the work of the 
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prosecution staff and the Judges.’13 
 
This example serves as a good explanation for the state of the court during its 
initial stage. Even though endowed with the powers arising out of Chapter VII 
of the UN Charta, the path to establish a fully operational court required more 
than just the will to pursue justice on an international scale. Given the work of 
its predecessors at Nuremberg and Tokyo, one might conclude that the ICTY 
could build up on its jurisdiction. However, the comparison between the 
Nuremberg proceedings and the ICTY’s soon pales. The defendants at 
Nuremberg were arrested soon after the allied powers invaded Germany and 
most of them were convicted under an enormous amount of documentary 
evidence collected. The tribunal in The Hague, however, did not have these 
amenities. Far away from the conflicts in question and from a continuing and 
ferocious war, with no ground force at hands, the ICTY struggled to establish 
itself as a credible judicial body. The first defendant at The Hague, Dusko 
Tadic14, did not testify before April 1995 and a judgment was not delivered 
before May 1996. In comparison, all major trials at Nuremberg had been 
concluded within 12 months time.15  
 
Meanwhile, in 1994 the ICTY was unable to prevent the killing of up to 8.000 
Bosnian man and children and furthermore failed to deter the atrocities 
committed in the Kosovo in the subsequent years. The problem in this respect 
was that states obligations to co-operate with the ICTY, which were enshrined 
in the Dayton Peace Accords and within the SC Resolutions, failed to take 
grip and the legal instruments at hands did not hamper the states for not 
complying. Furthermore, the Court faced severe difficulties in finding support 
within the international ground force in order to arrest the key players at stake. 
As a NATO Spokesman quoted in 1996, ‘Arresting Karadzic is not worth the 
blood of one NATO soldier’.16 
The mandate given to the 60.000 soldiers strong I-FOR force was to support 
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the ICTY fully and to hand over alleged perpetrators to The Hague.17 
However, NATO officials would not be too keen on hunting down the alleged 
defendants. This marks another main distinctive point between the 
Nuremberg trials and the ICTY. The Allied powers, by having occupied the 
territory of Nazi-Germany did not face any severe problems in arresting some 
of the main perpetrators. Contrarily, the ICTY did.  
 
The Hague tribunal strongly depends on national and international co-
operation, in both military and monetary means. The issue of state support 
and co-operation became one of the most discussed issues, when speaking 
about the work of the ICTY. To tackle the ongoing problem of non-compliance 
with the court, a reporting system was introduced, which allowed the president 
of the court to report directly to the SC, in case of non-co-operation of a state 
with the tribunal. This, however, proved to be ineffective and toothless. Most 
of the states concerned in these proceedings were at that point themselves 
involved in military operations and were therefore unwilling to co-operate with 
the tribunal. Frankly speaking, justice was put in second place.18   
But it was not merely the lack of support from states towards the ICTY. 
Furthermore, the SC failed to provide an efficient and ambitious response to 
these claims. In its fourth annual report to the General Assembly and the SC, 
the President of the Court held: ‘The tribunal remains a partial failure – 
through no fault of its own – because the vast majority of indictees continue to 
remain free, seemingly enjoying absolute immunity’19. Co-operations of states 
and the international community remained a crucial element for the court to 
succeed. In an open letter to the president of the SC, the former President of 
the ICTY, Gabrielle Kirk-McDonald emphasised with a sense of despair: 
‘On the verge of the twenty-first century, it is simply unacceptable that 
territories have become safe-havens for individuals indicted for the most 
serious offences against humanity. It must be made absolutely clear to such 
States that this behaviour is legally—as well as morally—wrong. The Security 
Council has the authority and wherewithal to rectify this situation. For the 
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benefit of all the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, I urge you to act’.20 
However, the international community widely ignored those claims, and once 
again, witnessed horrible atrocities being committed on the very soil the 
tribunal was initially intended to promote peace and stability.  
 
 
7.2.1 Justice in Times of War 
 
Again the question was raised, whether or not international criminal tribunals 
could contribute towards peace, even in times of an ongoing conflict. An 
answer to this question cannot be given without observing the different 
arguments. From the court’s perspective it was argued, that the crimes 
following the establishment of the tribunal could be prevented, if the states 
concerned would have complied fully with the court and if the key indictees 
would have been extradited.21 In contrast, the state parties accused the 
president and the prosecutor of the ICTY for undermining the ongoing 
negotiations of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1994 and 1995. Even further 
they blamed the human rights lobby for opposing the Vance-Owen plan, and 
being therefore responsible for the death of thousands of civilians.22Whether 
those accusations were true and justified can be doubted. It, however, seems 
clear beyond reasonable doubt, that the ICTY could not exercise its full 
powers during its initial phase and was therefore unable to prevent erupting 
hostilities by judicial means. It is furthermore questionable, if, by any means, 
alleged perpetrators should be invited to participate in peace negotiations. 
Manfred Nowak, in an interview given to the author, held that alleged 
perpetrators should not be given seat on such round tables, even though their 
political influence remains strong.23  
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7.2.2 The Legal Basis of the Court 
 
In 1993, when the SC already had imposed economic sanctions on Serbia, 
the atrocities committed had soon reached a level of severeness Europe had 
not experienced since the end of the Second World War. The SC, at the same 
time, began setting up a commission of experts, led by Professor Cherif 
Bassiouni, to investigate human rights violations on an international scale. At 
first hands, these efforts faced serious obstructions, in particular imposed by 
French and British diplomats. The opponents to this body held that justice 
considerations would interfere with their peace-building efforts and would 
therefore impose more harm then good24. However, the expert body managed 
to acquire the funding required to proceed in its investigations from private 
donors.25  Bassioumi acted with significant rapidity and issued an interim 
report only a few months after he commenced his investigations. In his report 
dated January 26th 1993, he concluded that cases of ethnic cleansing, mass 
murder, rape, pillage and destruction of cultural heritage had occurred. He 
furthermore urged in his report for the establishment of an international 
criminal tribunal to deal with those issues and that the situation at stake 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region.26His 
report consequently led to the adoption of SC Res. 808, providing that the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia created a situation of threat towards 
international peace and security. Furthermore, in the same resolution, the SC 
called for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal to carry out 
further investigations and promote peace and security in the region. 
However, from the very beginning, it was rather unclear, how the tribunal 
should be established from a legal perspective. The lessons learned from 
Nuremberg and Tokyo proved that it was of great importance for the 
acceptance and credibility of the tribunal to provide for a sound legal 
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framework, which would not let any legal criticism arise. In the end it was 
decided that the tribunal would derive its legitimacy from the fact that it was 
intended to be a measure restoring or maintaining international peace and 
security in the region.27The tribunal would be a subsidiary organ to the SC, 
but, however, would be independent in its judicial capacity from any political 
considerations. This decision did not go without any criticism. 
 
 
7.2.3 Criticism 
 
Shortly after Resolutions 808 and 827 were adopted, criticism amongst 
scholars arose, whether or not the SC had the legal powers establish such a 
tribunal. The answer to this question lies within the scope of Art. 39 and 41 
UN Charta. However, in the time of the Charta being drafted, it is hard to 
guess, whether it was intended to include the possibility to establish a criminal 
tribunal under these provisions. But the powers enshrined in Art. 41 and 42 
are wide ones and do not exclude the imposition of criminal responsibility on 
persons who’s actions demand punishment.28In Art.2(7) of the Charta, 
however, it is stated that the UN should not intervene in ‘matters which are 
essentially within the jurisdiction of any state’ but, it further provides, ‘this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII’. The SC agreed on this view and this sound and solid legal 
foundation was intended to prevent any accusations the Allied powers faced 
regarding ‘Victor’s Justice’ after WWII.  
The only alternative at hands would have been to build up the tribunal on a 
multinational treaty. This approach, however, includes two significant 
disadvantages: First, treaty negotiations are a lengthy process and to become 
legally binding, the treaty has to be signed and ratified. Secondly, by 
definition, only state-parties to the treaty would be bound by its jurisdiction. 
Nobody at this point was able to predict such a co-operation from the states in 
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the region involved.29In contrast, a tribunal established under Chapter VII 
would bind all states and it would clearly meet the criterion of 
expeditiousness.  
Another issue to be clarified before the creation of the tribunal was its implied 
scope and jurisdiction. According to SC Resolution 808 para.1 the tribunal 
‘shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991’.30 This determination leaves a wide discretion 
for future adoptions. However, the official name of the ICTY reflects this initial 
proposal. An even further problem was the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
tribunal. Bassioumi and others were well aware of the criticism raised by 
scholars, most notably Hans Kelsen, concerning the jurisdiction of the 
Nuremberg trials. The nullum crimen accusations should not have been 
repeated. For this reason, it became clear that the only possible remedy to 
prevent these allegations was to build up the legal basis of jurisdiction of the 
tribunal on customary international law, irrespective of whether or not it was 
codified and whether a state had adhered to such codified legal 
instruments.31A wide range of jurisdiction was already at hands at this point 
and did not leave any solid ground for criticism in this respect. Furthermore 
the accusations of retrospective punishment would not occur. Another major 
difference to its predecessor at Nuremberg was the application of jurisdiction 
not only in an international armed conflict. Major Nazi-officials could not have 
been legally punished for crimes committed against their own fellow-citizens. 
This does not apply to the ICTY since the application of international 
humanitarian law was not in question for this situation.  
 
 
7.2.4 Legal Basis of Jurisdiction 
 
The main articles in the statute of the court, concerning its legal scope were 
set out as follows: 
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Art.2 of the Statute empowers the court to punish ‘Grave Breaches’ of the 
Geneva Convention of 1949 (i.e. wilful killings, torture, ill-treatment of 
prisoners etc.). Art.3 sets forth the powers to punish violations of the 1907 
The Hague Conventions regarding the laws and customs of war. Art. 4 breaks 
ground for the punishment of genocide, i.e. attempts to destroy a group on 
national or ethnic or religious grounds. Art.5 gives jurisdiction to punish crimes 
against humanity. 32   
In the Tadic-case, arguing that the Art.3 purely applies to international armed 
conflicts, an attempt to challenge the jurisdiction of the court was made. The 
definitional approach of the court, however, of what an international armed 
conflict is, was significantly broader in this respect. They found Art.3 being 
applicable in case of two confronting parties, as long as they are ‘armed’ and 
‘organized’. 
The Appeals Chamber held: 
‘...an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International 
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and 
extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace 
is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is 
achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply 
in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, 
the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat 
takes place there.’33 
The Appeals Chamber by setting aside the legal limitations of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions created a new regime for criminal liability in the case of 
war crimes. The ICTR in Arusha, facing the very same legal obstacles, 
followed suit in the Kanyabashi34 case. 
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7.2.5 How the ICTY operates 
 
As discussed above, Art. 2-5 give jurisdiction to the court over crimes, which 
were in 1992 assumed being customary international law. So no defendant 
could argue that he faced charges, which did not exist at the time he was 
alleged to have committed them. A significant difference between the 
jurisdiction of the ICTY and the Nuremberg trials in this respect is, however, 
that the jurisdiction is solely limited to natural persons. Art.6 of the Statute 
provides no jurisdiction over organizations or associations. In contrast, as 
seen in the previous chapter, the IMT at Nuremberg declared organizations 
such as the GESTAPO or the SS illegal per se. Therefore, any membership or 
affiliation towards one of these organisations was declared unlawful and 
punishable. The ICTY refused from doing do. 
During the initial phase of the ICTY, when the conflict was still immanent and 
ongoing in the Balkans, the Office of the Prosecutor  (OTP) was hampered by 
a lack of access to documents, evidences crime scenes, intelligence 
information and supportive governments. Most of the evidence collected at 
that time came from persons, who emigrated from the region.35 As a result, 
the OTP collected a significant amount of evidence about mid- and lower-level 
officials. Many of the initial cases at The Hague were carried out against such 
defendants.36 Those cases consumed a huge amount of resources, by means 
of time and monetary spending. The ICTY in this respect had to take a lot of 
critique for not co-ordinating its investigations in a more housewifely manner.37 
The ICTY, especially Claude Jorda, President of the Tribunal from 1999 to 
2003, justified these allegations by holding that more emphasis had to be put 
on the role of the victims. Victims should find an open stage at The Hague 
where, for the first time in history, their story would be heard. This approach 
led to the establishment of the term `Victim’s Justice’, in contrast to Victor’s 
Justice, when speaking about the work of the ICTY. 
                                                
35
 Schrag, Minna: Lessons Learned from the ICTY Experience in Journal of International Criminal 
Justice; p.427-434; Vol. 2; 2004; p.4 
36
 see especially Prosecutor v. Nikolic and Prosecutor v. Tadic 
37
 Raab, Dominik: Evaluating the ICTY and its Completion Strategy in Journal of International 
Criminal Justice; p.82-102; Vol. 3; 2005; p.3; 
 -65- 
 
The Court itself has primacy powers over national jurisdiction, which is a 
rather different approach compared with the principle of complementarity 
within the legal framework of the ICC. Those primacy powers enable the court 
to wrest jurisdiction from national courts. However, the principle of ne bis in 
idem remains valid.  
 
7.2.6 Structure or the Court 
 
The structural organisation of the court is rather simple. However, compared 
to its predecessors at Nuremberg and Tokyo, the ICTY introduced some 
additional features in order to fulfil all requirements of a fair and due trial. All 
the judges serving at The Hague serve in their own capacity. A broad variety 
of representation from different legal systems is guaranteed. To date, 16 
permanent judges and 12 ad litem judges are engaged at the three Trial 
Chambers and the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals Chamber was initially 
shared with the Arusha Court, but due to the Completion Strategy of the ICTY, 
introduced in 2003 by the SC, the ICTY received its own Appeals Chamber to 
match the provisions of the SC. The other two organisational bodies of the 
ICTY are the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and the Registry. Compared to 
the trials at Nuremberg, where there has been no instance for appeal and no 
common prosecution service, the ICTY structure appears to be clearer, but 
still more expensive and time consuming. Still critics claim that the principle of 
equality of arms is not sufficiently provided in the proceedings.38Critics 
demand the creation of a principle defender, of the same status as the 
prosecutor, in order to provide for a fair trial. The argument for such an 
institution is due to the often overstrained and less-educated defence 
attorneys during the initial stage of the tribunal. This situation has changed 
significantly in recent history. Defendants are nowadays represented by the 
most honourable attorneys from all over the world and the situation hence has 
changed and nowadays looks rather grim for the OTP, which is highly 
understaffed and lacks funding to carry out investigations in an adequate 
manner. 
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7.3 The ICTY and Balkan Reconciliation 
 
 
To date the tribunal has concluded proceedings against 116 alleged 
perpetrators. 45 proceedings are still ongoing and two of the key figures, 
Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic, remain at large. The overall costs since 1993 
has amounted USD 1.585.490.022 ,- .39The average cost for one single trial 
stands at USD 10 – 15 Mio..40 Those immense costs have often been of 
particular interest for critics of the tribunal. Still, is there a price for justice?  
 
War crimes trials are expensive, indeed. Hundreds of people are engaged in 
their proceedings. Evidence has to be collected, witnesses have to testify, 
data has to be evaluated and after all, the court in its own capacity sits outside 
the region in question. But did the work concluded lead to reconciliation? 
The establishment of the tribunal represents the attempt to apply human 
rights law in a situation where states have failed to protect their citizens from 
atrocities and where successor regimes had failed to investigate and 
prosecute gross human rights abuses.41 The ICTY has sought to carry out, 
what national courts could not and provided for the institutional groundwork 
for the re-establishment of the Rule of Law in the region. Furthermore it 
challenged legal impunity through the prosecution of those most responsible, 
restored the authority of law and promoted reconciliation amongst divided 
ethnic groups.  
The prosecution of the key figures of the Balkan wars led to the 
individualisation of guilt and helped to put the political and organisational 
character of the crimes committed into context. 42The establishment of the 
tribunal, however, is just one part of a strategy to promote peace in the long 
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term. Additionally, the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions, 
democratic elections and peace negotiations were installed to accelerate and 
complete the process.  
The importance of the legal bodies in the concept of Transitional Justice is 
their institutionalized status; the work accomplished by a structure of laws 
cannot be accomplished by a structure of sentiments.43Politically, it is the task 
of the state to recover the status of a victim. International law, in this respect, 
provides this recovery for a victim against a state. Usually, state violence does 
not violate the rights of a single person more then compared to a normal 
criminal offence, but as representatives of a particular social or ethnic group, 
state crimes do stigmatize the whole ethnic or religious entity. By identifying 
those offences, international law helps to identify and remedy those stigmas.44  
But in a conflict as complex as the one in the Balkans, it is often unclear to 
determine distinctly, who the key perpetrators were. Figures show, that more 
then 15.000 individuals committed crimes directly related to the conflict. Given 
this sheer amount of persons, the question arises, how an international court 
can cope with this workload. International criminal prosecution therefore must 
not claim to deal with every single case, but to break ground for subsequent 
cases to be dealt with either through national judicial systems or non-judicial 
mechanisms. Without penalizing gross human rights violations reconciliation 
may be doomed to failure.45The assumption that justice was directly linked to 
long-lasting peace, was crucial for the creation of the ICTY and influenced 
from the experience of the Nuremberg legacy, which helped to turn post-Nazi 
Germany into a sustainable democracy. 
Even though reconciliation was not expressively mentioned in the mandate 
given to the ICTY, the court itself emphasised its role in this regards. 
In the Erdemovic46 case, the court held: 
‘The International Tribunal, in addition to its mandate to investigate, prosecute 
and punish serious violations of international humanitarian law, has a duty, 
through its judicial functions, to contribute to the settlement of the wider issues 
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of accountability, reconciliation and establishing the truth behind the evils 
perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia. Discovering the truth is a cornerstone of 
the rule of law and a fundamental step on the way to reconciliation: for it is the 
truth that cleanses the ethnic and religious hatreds and begins the healing 
process.’47 
 
But still there is shared consensus that if the tribunal is to fulfil its mandate 
and to promote peace and reconciliation in the region, an effort must be made 
to improve the understanding of the work of the court in the former 
Yugoslavia. In order to lay the ground for promoting the work of the ICTY, it is 
from utter importance to create a system, through which people in the region 
can inform themselves about the work of the court. For this reason in 1999, 
Gabrielle Kirk-McDonald established the ICTY Outreach Program. This 
program enables the local population to learn more about the work of the 
tribunal. The program was designed to ‘provide a comprehensive proactive 
information campaign stressing the Tribunal’s impartiality and independence, 
as well as countering the endemic misconceptions that had prompted 
widespread disillusionment with the Tribunal in the former Yugoslavia’.48 
The four regional offices set up in Prishtina, Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb 
engage with local communities, non-governmental organisations, the media 
and educational institutions. The program further includes websites and the 
translation of important legal documents. The key role of the campaign is to 
disseminate trial proceedings as wide as possible and to refute wrong 
information.  
 
 
7.3.1 Evaluating Reconciliation 
 
But how can the impact of the ICTY on reconciliation be evaluated? 
Conclusive data and evaluating surveys are rare in this respect.  
Most notably for the local population was indeed the removal of some key 
political figures from their position, since those persons were responsible for 
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policies such as ethnic cleansing. As Payman Akhavan states: ‘…the removal 
of leaders with criminal dispositions and a vested interest in conflict makes a 
positive contribution to post-conflict peace building. In concert with other 
policy measures, resort to international criminal tribunals can play a significant 
role in discrediting and containing destabilizing political forces. Stigmatizing 
delinquent leaders through indictment, as well as apprehension and 
prosecution, undermines their influence. Even if wartime leaders still enjoy 
popular support among an indoctrinated public at home, exclusion from the 
international sphere can significantly impede their long-term exercise of 
power.’49 
 
The constant negative reaction of Serb leaders to the arrests of the ICTY 
reflects the impact on the post-conflict society. The ICTY’s indictments have 
furthermore contributed positively to the emergence of a number of moderate 
political leaders in the region, which now endorse confronting the past and call 
for a return of the refugees.50 However, still today in Croatia and Serbia 
extremist leaders refrain from co-operating with the tribunal and deny their 
role in history. Tragic peak of this development was the assassination of the 
former Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003 for his co-
operation with the ICTY. The circumstances were never restored fully. In this 
respect, it must be borne in mind, that the ICTY proceedings and findings 
undermine the political forces aligned with ethnic chauvinism. Therefore, 
political opposition towards the tribunal should not come as a surprise.51 As 
Akhavan observes, co-operation with the ICTY had become ‘a factor in the 
power struggle between nationalist forces and democratic elements 
committed to democratic reform’ and multi-ethic reconciliation. Even further, 
the opposition towards the Hague tribunal obscures an intrinsic link between 
‘supposedly patriotic concerns about war heroes and the self-preservation of 
political forces that exploited the conflict for their own ends’.52  
Particular in Serbia, the political attitude towards the tribunal becomes a 
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question of sheer vote calculation. None of the major parties is keen on 
getting an un-patriotic image by affiliating with the tribunal. Most of the 
politicians therefore walk a thin line between co-operating with the court (and 
the European Union) and gaining voters confidence in being patriotic. The 
strong rhetoric of the Milosevic era opposing the ICTY still remains vivid the in 
the heads of a large number of voters, even though the access to information 
and the media coverage has significantly changed since that time. Milosevic 
accused the tribunal’s concept of justice as being sheer injustice towards the 
Serbs. As a Serbian Scholar put it: ‘They are killing Serbs in The Hague!’53  
Even whilst in the docks, Milosevic used the tribunal as a stage to promote his 
views and gained a lot of attention in Serbia and all over the region and 
undermined the courts credibility and integrity. Even his death in March 2006 
and whether it occurred under natural circumstances, was questioned by the 
local Serb population and senior politicians.  
Surveys amongst the population in various different countries of the region 
come to rather different conclusions, regarding the perception of the courts 
work. 
While in Kosovo people conclude that the work of the ICTY has been fair and 
just, the figures in Serbia and the Republica Srbska look rather grim.54  
More recent surveys support this result. Serbia thereby evinced the least trust 
in the work of the ICTY – only 8% trusted in the work of the Court. On the 
flipside, trust in the Kosovo was still very high, standing at 83%, whilst the 
level of trust in Bosnia stood at 51%.55 These figures give a good impression 
on the overall impression on the perception of the courts work in the region 
and why the Outreach Program has to be furthermore enhanced. 
 
 
7.3.2 Did the court fail to prevent future atrocities? 
 
This question was raised openly when speaking about the early years of the 
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tribunal. The ICTY, established in 1993, was unable to prevent the massacre 
in Srebrenica and the erupting violence in Kosovo in 1999. Yet, it is unrealistic 
to assume that the tribunal could have immediately after its creation deterred 
crimes in the midst of an ongoing nationalist-led conflict. But the impact of the 
ICTY on the political sphere cannot be assessed on a short-term scale. Far 
more important is the ICTY’s impact on long-term developments in the 
region.56 Public vindication of human rights and the marginalization of criminal 
leaders may contribute to prevent future atrocities through the power of moral 
example to transfer behaviour.57 Additionally, holding perpetrators 
accountable can mark a significant shift in policy and can break with the past 
and it provides for punishment of the persons politically responsible for the 
atrocities and can, in this respect, individualize guilt, contrary to blaming a 
society as a whole. 
This is vital since the rejection of a notion of collective guilt can lead to a clear 
interpretation of the facts and figures of and conflict and can provide to 
enhance dialogue and co-operations between former antagonistic 
communities.  
 
 
7.3.3 Complementary Approaches 
 
Despite its overall success, the proceedings of the ICTY have been very 
complex in nature. Trials are costly, slow, time consuming and procedurally 
complicated. It has been estimated that about 15.000 persons were 
responsible for war crimes committed in the region of the former Yugoslavia 
during the 1990’s. This colossal number, beyond any doubt, exceeds the 
capacity of any tribunal. Hence, different approaches have to provide for an 
alternative to deal with these open cases. One alternative is to try perpetrators 
on a national level.58The idea is not new and is an integral part of the ICTY’s 
Completion Strategy59. During the first half of the 1990’s it was, however, 
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impossible to engage local courts with war crimes proceedings, due to a lack 
of capacity, impartiality and their immanent link with respective criminal 
regimes.60 
However, with the emergence of peace and stability in the region and with 
huge support and funding from the international community (especially from 
the EU), local judicial systems became operational again. 
In paragraph 1 and 5 of SC Res. 1504 (2003) the transfer of cases to national 
courts was encouraged expressively. The ICTY’s constant overload of cases 
and its immense spending primarily led to this development. The transfer of 
cases would, in essence, allow for the backlog of cases at the ICTY to be 
eased, by sending some lower- and middle-ranking cases to national courts. 
In addition to its impact on the ICTY caseload and resources, there is an 
advantage in sending cases back to the area in which the crimes were 
committed in the first place. It may be regarded as an element of the 
reconciliation process, with trials conducted closer to the locations of the 
crimes and the victims. Such trials may be perceived as having greater 
resonance (and, for some, legitimacy) if they are conducted under the 
auspices of the states of the former Yugoslavia rather than in The Hague. In 
sum, the transfer of cases will free up some of the ICTY’s resources and 
complement trials in The Hague by nationalizing - where appropriate - the 
process of accountability.61 
 
Most of the cases were transferred to courts in Serbia and Montenegro. 
However, in a report issued by the Organisation for Security and Co-
Operation in Europe (OSCE) in October 2003 it was held, ‘the national 
judiciary lacks full capacity to conduct war crimes trials in accordance with 
universally adopted standards’. There remain ‘enormous challenges’, 
particularly in relation to the state’s legal and institutional framework, securing 
evidence, witness protection, regional cooperation, ICTY cooperation and the 
application of the concept of ‘command responsibility’.62 
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Almost the same criticism was raised regarding war crimes trials in Croatia 
and in the Kosovo. 
A rather different approach was made in a joint program between the Office of 
the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR) and the ICTY in 
2003. They put forward the idea of establishing the Sarajevo War Crimes 
Chamber (SWCC) within the judicial framework of the national system. The 
SWCC as a hybrid creation includes a temporary international composition of 
judges, prosecutors and administrative judges. This initial international 
composition was reduced step by step, but proofed being a great success 
compared to its solely national counterparts. The chamber itself contains of 
three panels: two for trials at first instance and one for appeals. Since it 
became operational, the court has rendered a significant amount of important 
judgments. 
 
Although still working on a low capacity, the potential of local trials in respect 
of reconciliation should not be underestimated. Proceedings on a national 
level are less costly, less time consuming, better capable for the public and 
their impact on the local population is more long lasting then those of their 
international counterparts.63 
Local trials complete and complement the work of the ICTY and bring 
accountability for war crimes back to where they have been committed in the 
first place. Still, criminal proceedings are just symbolic in a sense of being 
selective and limited and can therefore not provide for an all-encompassing 
judicial remedy.64 
 
 
7.3.4 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
 
Most commonly in complementing the work of judicial bodies in the case of 
post-conflict reconciliation, is the work of truth and reconciliation commissions. 
But truth commissions even bear a number of risks. Depending of who 
establishes such a commission, the actual findings may vary. They can be 
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used to manipulate public perception at home and abroad and can serve to 
whitewash past atrocities.65The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
established by the Serbian President Vojislav Kostunica may fall under this 
category. The commission set up in 2001 was given a mandate for three 
years. Most of the appointees were nationalist Serbs, which, as does Mr. 
Kostunica himself, oppose the work of the ICTY and refrained for years to 
extradite Mr. Milosevic and others to The Hague. For this reason, the 
commission has widely been accepted as a fig leaf, to diminish or neutralize 
pressure put on the Serbian government from abroad to investigate in 
pending cases and contribute towards national healing.66 The commission 
itself, not surprisingly, failed to produce any findings.67 
Though, it must be noted that several other commissions have been set up in 
countries all over the Balkans and have produced credible and important 
facts. Supplemented by the work of a numerous number of NGO’s, their work 
has proved to be highly valuable and important to accomplish the overall goal 
of reconciliation amongst ethnic groups.  
 
 
7.3.5 Plea Agreements and Balkan Reconciliation 
 
 
„.... Serbs would never allow themselves to become victims again!“ (Biljana 
Plavcic) 
 
With this statement one of the accused persons at the ICTY, Biljana Plavcic 
(„The Iron Lady“)68 opened her defence speech before the court in 2001. She 
argued that during the whole time of Serbian history, Serbs have always been 
oppressed. This blind obsession to become victims again had allowed them to 
become victimizers.69 
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This opens the issue, of how difficult it was for the court to establish a 
historical record, proving the facts that led to the escalation of the conflict. 
However, the empirical evidence collected and the thousands of protocols 
from witnesses testifying before the bench do not replace the true remorse of 
an alleged perpetrator, when it comes down to national reconciliation. As we 
have seen above, the resources of the ICTY, both concerning time and 
funding, are highly limited. Therefore it is from utter importance to use the 
given resources distinctively. As the Court finally started its work in 1994, a 
large number of cases (about 160) were brought for trial to the ICTY. Years 
later about a hundred of these files had been closed. Since the beginning of 
its work, about 148 persons have been publicly reported. Of these, 50 have 
been tried, yielding 45 convictions and five acquittals.70 So within the last 14 
years, not even two thirds of all cases have been closed. Because the 
collection of evidence and the hearings of witnesses cannot be conducted in a 
short period of time, it is not unusual for a trial to take more than one year. In 
terms of the number of cases, the ICTY had tried and sentenced 50 
individuals till 2004, which was the year when the UN questioned the ICTY’s 
efficiency. The ICTY budget for 2002/2003 represents approximately 8.5% of 
the regular UN budget, although it was less then 1% of the entire range of 
expenditure on UN activities.71 
The ICTY’s first response to its growing caseload and expensive trails was to 
withdraw indictments against several lower-level officials. Next, the ICTY 
requested the addition of 27 ‘Ad Litem’ Judges to support the 11 permanent 
judges. But this alone was not enough to increase the efficiency of the 
tribunal.72 
 
Furthermore, due to the increase of caseload the tribunal faced, a new 
procedural instrument, commonly known from the Anglo-American judicial 
tradition, was introduced into the judicial process of the ICTY – Plea 
Bargaining. 
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Although countless attempts have been made to propose a general definition 
of plea bargaining, none of those proved to be sufficient. Generally speaking, 
‘American Plea Bargaining is a procedural mechanism through 
which the prosecution and defence can arrive at an agreement for 
the disposition of a case, subject of the approval of the court. The 
agreement may present itself in several forms, but it usually 
consists of the defendant pleading guilty to an offence or a number 
of offences. In exchange, the prosecutor drops other charges, 
accepts that the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offence or 
requests that the defendant receives a certain sentence.’73 
 
To put it in other words, plea bargaining consists of an agreement 
between the prosecutor and the defended. The prosecutor typically 
agrees to a reduced sentence in exchange for the defendant’s waiver of 
his rights to appeal against the sentence and go on a ‘normal’ jury trial. 
The „Rules of Procedure and Evidence“74 of the ICTY, seen as a hybrid 
between the Anglo-American law system and Continental-European law 
system, contain guidelines from both law traditions. Even though plea 
bargaining was not intended being used during the initial period of trials, it 
became an important procedural instrument of the ICTY in recent history. 
The legal basis for plea agreements before the tribunal is rule 62bis in the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
During the very first years of the ICTY only a handful of trials have been 
resolved through negotiated dispositions. The majority of cases was resolved 
through normal trial proceedings. In detail, in the period between 1993 and 
2003 only eight cases came to an end with a so-called ‘Plea Agreement’ 
between the OTP and the accused.75 But as I mentioned before, the mandate 
of the ICTY is supposed to run out in a foreseeable future and all files should 
be closed by this time, and that is why plea agreements became a stable 
practice of the ICTY. Plea agreements accelerates the judicial procedure, 
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because the main actors of this method, the OTP and the accused end the 
trial before it even began with the help of a guilt plea. 
 
Since 2003, plea bargaining has become one of the main solutions for trials 
before the court, and the number of cases solved through an agreement has 
reached a peak. And while the judges of the ICTY initially determined that 
Plea Agreements would be improper for the special purpose of an 
international criminal court, seven years after its establishment the judges 
reversed their opinion and began to aggressively pursue guilt pleas. This shift 
occurred shortly after Judge Gabrielle Kirk-McDonald of the United States 
succeeded Antonio Cassese as president of the tribunal.  Judge McDonald 
had been a federal judge in a country, where 95% of criminal cases are 
decided by plea agreements. After this paradigm-change, between 2001 and 
2003, the ICTY entered 12 plea agreements, clearing 40% of ongoing the 
cases.76 
 Even though this method of procedure ensures a quick and efficient trial, 
many critics entered the stage claiming that plea agreements undermine the 
defendant’s rights to a fair trial. Truly, in return of the reduction of the 
sentence the accused waivers, for instant, his right to appeal against his 
sentence and for a conventional trial. 
The disadvantages of this procedure are quite obvious, because it is not 
unlikely that two accused persons, facing the same charge for a crime, receive 
a different sentence, just because the one who did not waive his right to go on 
a fair trial, gets no ‘benefit’ from the prosecutor, such as the one does who 
negotiated his guilt plea agreement. But on the other hand, proponents of plea 
agreements argue that negotiated guilt pleas accurately reflect ‘each 
defendant’s true criminal responsibility’.77  
 
The impact of guilt pleas before the court on reconciliation and peace building 
was and still is highly disputed amongst legal scholars. Some may argue that 
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guilt pleas represent a trade of justice for efficiency; others may argue that it is 
crucial for reconciliation that perpetrators admit their guilt. 
In a phase of transitional justice, it is from utter importance, as I have 
already stated above, that guilt and responsibility is provided on a 
particularistic, rather than collective basis.78  
Since the ICTY works on a selective basis regarding the prosecution of 
perpetrators, measuring the effect on reconciliation of these trials depend 
on opposite factors: First, the positive impact on victims who see their 
perpetrator tried. Secondly, the negative impact on victims who do not 
see justice to be done.79  
James Meernik, by evaluating these assumptions, concludes that the 
impact of the ICTY trials on the society are rather glimpse. The reason 
given for this is the prosecutor’s focus on high ranking and senior 
perpetrators, which are uneasy to link with the actual atrocities, that have 
taken place in the field.80 But I will come back on the issue of plea 
bargaining in further detail in the following chapter. 
 
7.3.5.1 Prijdor and  Srebrenica – Why do they (not) return? 
 
Two of the places gaining most attention from the international 
community and the ICTY are Prijdor and Srebrenica in Bosnia. 
Srebrenica nowadays almost stands as a proxy for all the atrocities 
occurred and for the whole conflict as such. 
In both cities, before 1993, the population was divided evenly between 
the Serb and Bosniak population. But the situation changed dramatically 
in the years to come. The Serbian army by force took over the control of 
both cities and the killings on thousands of Croats, Bosniaks and others 
began in the fields and in nearby concentration camps.  
The ICTY indicted seventeen persons for the killings in Srebrenica and 
twenty-three for the atrocities committed in the municipality of Prijedor. 
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The most notable cases in this respect were the cases of Tadic v. 
Prosecutor and Erdemovic v. Prosecutor. 
However, even having established such a sound caseload on those two 
happenings, the impact on the region concerned proved to be rather 
different. Whilst Prijedor is one of the leading municipalities to which 
former refugees are returning, the percentage in Srebrenica is amongst 
the lowest.81 
One of the reasons given for this is the fact in the case of Prijedor, the 
ICTY put several low-ranking officials on trial. Dusko Tadic, for instance, 
was recognized by a large number of victims as a perpetrator. In his 
case, over 153 victims delivered testimonies to the court. This did not 
apply for Srebrenica. The only remarkable case, in this respect, was the 
proceedings against Drazan Erdemovic. 
After pleading guilty and revealing his accomplices, he was sentenced to 
a term of ten years imprisonment (later reduced to five years). Even 
though the Erdemovic case was ground breaking and led to further 
indictments of nineteen persons (mostly high-ranking officials), it also put 
the courts credibility into question. The guilt plea of Erdemovic clearly 
shows, why this instrument of dispute settlement is so controversial. 
Indeed, without the co-operation of Drazan Erdemovic, the proceedings 
against others would not have happened so easily, his sentence does not 
reflect the true nature of his crimes committed. Victims did not see justice 
to be served.82 
 
Victims, according to some NGO’s, did not start to return to their homes 
until 2003 in Srebrenica. In contrast, victims and refugees in the 
municipality of Prijedor started to return earlier to their homes. The 
judgments delivered in the Prijedor proceedings were more vigorous and 
deterring and more low-ranking officials had been tried. 
After the Erdemovic case and the guilt plea, the ICTY revised his strategy 
towards plea-bargaining in order to prevent future outcomes like in 
Srebrenica. 
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In order to assure a positive outcome of a trial, regarding its impact on the 
society, three different aspects are crucial: The indictments, the trial 
chamber and the sentencing process. 
The indictments aspect contains the number of persons indicted by the 
court and the charges they face. The trial chamber deals with the actual 
trial: how many charges did the defendant face, did he/she enter a guilt 
plea, how many witnesses were examined. The sentencing process 
mainly focuses on the actual sentences handed out and whether or not it 
appears objectively suitable for the crimes committed. 83 
Other crucial factors, which determine the overall setup of the region 
concerned, are: The size of the ethnic minority, war suffering, the 
economic situation and the degree of nationalism. All those factors come 
into play for the return of former inhabitants. 
The more a society has suffered in the war, the less likely it is for them to 
return. Furthermore, the smaller an ethnic minority in a certain region is, the 
less likely it is for them to return and finally, refugees are less likely to return 
to areas, where nationalist parties win elections.84 
Another very important factor that comes into play for the return of refugees to 
their homes is, whether or not the defendant pleaded guilty for the crimes 
committed. As Monika Nalepa points out, guilt pleas do increase the returns 
and the absolute effect is larger, compared to conventional judgments. 85 
Guilt pleas involve the disclosure of information regarding the wrongdoings of 
the person in question and other persons involved. The offered truth about the 
character of the war crimes in question is traded for a sentence reduction. 
Although those pleas reduce the level of justice in the most legalistic sense, 
the information provided can lead to reconciliation and further investigations. 
Hence, indirectly, guilt pleas do contribute to justice. Still, the long-term effect 
of deterrence is undermined by judgements based on guilt pleas. The ICTY, 
however, was very eager to focus on high-ranking perpetrators and was 
therefore willing to pay the price of bypassing low- and middle-class criminals. 
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7.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
The work the ICTY has done regarding Balkan reconciliation is truly 
remarkable. Even though critics claim that the court has acted slowly and un-
efficiently, the historic record created by the tribunal is truly outstanding. 
Never before in history, such a sound amount of material has been gathered, 
so many witnesses have been heard and so many key-perpetrators stood trial 
before an international criminal tribunal. The conflict record thus produced has 
led to stabilization and reconciliation in some key areas of the Balkan. But still, 
the true nature of the tribunal and its achievements are hard to evaluate on 
the short term. The long-term perspective will show, how effective the 
tribunal’s work was. After more than 160 trials already completed, prosecuted 
senior officials such as Tadic, Milosevic and Bilijana Plavcic, the true nature of 
the conflict and the atrocities committed can not be denied by future 
generations. This achievement alone, apart from many others, justifies the 
major spending of the court and will provide for a credible predecessor for 
future tribunals. 
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7.5 App.I .: Important Guilt Pleas before the ICTY 
 
 
 
 
 
Case Name Case No. First Amended 
Indictment 
Plea Agreement 
entered 
Cesic "Brcko" (IT-95-10/1) 26 November 2002 8 October 2003 
Rajic  "Stupni Do" (IT-95-12) 14 January 2004 25 October 2005 
Bralo  "Lasva 
Valley" 
(IT-95-17) 19 July 2005 19 July 2005 
  Zelenovic  (IT-96-23/2) 26 June 1996 17 January 2007 
Plavsic "Bosnia 
and Herzegovina" 
 
(IT-00-39 & 40/1) 7 March 2002 30 September 2002  
Momir Nikolic  
"Srebrenica" 
 
(IT-02-60/1) 27 May 2002 7 May 2003 
  Obrenovic 
"Srebrenica" 
(IT-02-60/2) 27 May 2002 20 May 2003 
  Deronjic 
"Glogova" 
(IT-02-61) 30 September 2003 30 September 2003 
  Banovic) " 
Omarska Camp 
and Keraterm 
Camp" 
(IT-02-65/1 21 November 2002 26 June 2003 
  Babic  (IT-03-72) 17 November 2003 22 January 2004 
  Jankovic & 
Stankovic. "Foca" 
(IT-96-23/2) 7 October 1999 16 January 2007 
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8. Transitional Justice and The International Criminal Court 
 
 
Since the establishment of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in 
1946 by the victory powers, the world has torn from handing over 
competences to an international judicial body dealing with mass atrocities 
committed during times of war. In the late 1990’s that policy changed by 
establishing the two ‘sister tribunals’ for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 
and for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994.  
 
This approach, of establishing two independent judicial bodies on the basis of 
a Chapter VII Resolution by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), was 
a significant step forward towards the erection of an international regime for 
criminal justice and accountability. Nevertheless, both tribunals faced two 
major handicaps – they are both timely and territorially limited in their 
jurisdiction. The mandate given to them was due to run out in the next years, 
according to the UN imposed Completion Strategy. 
Bur nevertheless, in 1998 a new player appeared on the international screen 
– the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
 
 
8.1 Rome 1998 and the Politics 
 
The Rome conference was meant to mark a millennium moment for the 
Human Rights Movements. Additionally to hundreds of representatives from 
national governments, a vast number of representatives from about 175 
NGO’s, led by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, attended the 
gathering, lobbying for their interests. It was the first time in the relatively short 
history of modern international criminal law that NGO’s were given a forum to 
promote their ideas. In 1995, three years prior to the final negotiations in 
Rome, the Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC) was founded, 
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gathering a huge number of individuals and organisations promoting ideas for 
an independent and permanent criminal court.1  
 
But from the very beginning of negotiation for an international criminal court, it 
was rather unclear, how it would actually be shaped. Wide disagreement was 
predominant amongst the international community. About 1.700 different 
drafts were submitted as ‘alternative choices’ to state representatives in and 
prior to Rome. But most of the state representatives recognised the 
importance of such an institutions and knew about their unique chance. 
As Hans Köchler put it: ‘…the creation of the International Criminal Court may 
be considered as a genuine revolution in the system of modern international 
law’.2 
 
Indeed, the fact that so many different states opted for the establishment of 
such a judicial institution on a multilateral basis can clearly be held as 
significant. But as Geoffrey Robertson notes, ‘Cynics thought at the time that 
even the most enthusiastic states would take years to make the necessary 
amendments to their national laws and the necessary sixty ratifications would 
not be deposited for at least a decade’.3 
However, those cynics were about to be surprised, when in 2002 the ICC 
became operational. It was clear from the very beginning of the negotiations, 
that a broad compromise had to be struck and that it was from utter 
importance for the success of the yet to be created court, to found its birth on 
a wide-ranging consensus. 
During the actual conference, delegations split in three different groups. The 
‘like-minded’ group of 42 states, led by Canada and Germany, wanted a 
powerful prosecutor and a court which is clearly independent from the SC, 
equipped with powers to prosecute war crimes on a global basis.  
On the other hand, the US, France and China promoted the idea of an court 
controlled by the SC, where they could use their veto-powers to stop 
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embarrassing investigations. The third group of countries - such as Iraq, Iran, 
Libya and Indonesia – did not want a court at all.  
Pressure groups, such as Amnesty International argued for an all-powerful 
prosecutor. In a paper they expressed their views on the issue, holding that 
‘State practice demonstrates that prosecutors are unlikely to bring cases 
where the evidence is weak’, which makes it therefore necessary to prosecute 
large-scale atrocities on an international level.4 The final outcome of the 
negotiations provided for a mixture of all those ideas. 
The ICC was intended to mark a common international effort to eliminate a 
climate of impunity amongst those, most responsible for the most heinous 
crimes. Above all, the ICC was furthermore created to complement the 
national judicial systems by prosecuting persons responsible fro genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes where national systems could not 
provide for an effective remedy.  
As Darryl Robinson notes: ‘It is expected that the ICC will contribute to a 
climate of accountability not only through the ‘multiplier effect’ of its 
complementarity jurisdiction, as it encourages states to more diligently 
apprehend and prosecute international criminals’.5  
 
On paper, after long hours of negotiations in Rome until the very last minute, 
the statute appeared to be a success and managed to serve the interests of 
states and NGOs alike. Especially the definitional sections of the crimes 
enshrined in the statute were able to consolidate many of the conceptual 
advances in human rights law. Crimes against humanity were established as 
‘offences, which may be committed at times of comparative peace as well as 
internal or international war, while war crimes may be committed during an 
internal conflict’6. Sexual violence was finally marked as a war crime, following 
the definitions of the ICTY/ICTR and the defence was granted far reaching 
powers. Concessions, however, were made throughout the negotiations 
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process in order to keep the United States and other key states aboard. 
Those flaws remain embedded in the statute even after the United States had 
decided to oppose the court. Many concerns were raised that the court, 
initially intended to serve the principle of independence, was due to become a 
political institution. Yet, politicization of courts in cases of international crimes 
is much less virulent in the framework of a permanent institution than in 
national or regional (ad hoc) proceedings.7 
A permanent and supranational structured institution, such as the ICC, best 
avoids the ‘one-sidedness of the current pursuit of universal jurisdiction’ in 
regards to claims for universal jurisdiction by national judges.8 The ICC is in a 
position to overcome the weaknesses and disadvantages ad-hoc tribunals 
bear and may enjoy universal legitimacy and credibility. The fact that the 
jurisdiction of the court provides for the prosecution of heads of states and the 
reason that the court does not serve as an UN organ in the first place does 
aggravate this conclusion. 
 
 
8.2 The Statute 
 
‘Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced 
together in a shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be 
shattered at any time…’9 
 
Art. 1 of the Rome Statute establishes the court as a permanent institution 
with the jurisdiction to try persons its prosecutor accuses of the most serious 
crimes of international concern. It is equipped with legal personality, which 
opens the way to enter into legally binding agreements with sovereign states 
and other institutions, which possess the same capacity. The ICC is 
furthermore established as a permanent international body with 
‘complemetary’ jurisdiction to complement national courts that are ‘unable or 
unwilling’ to carry out investigations in their own capacity.  
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The mistakes and errors done at Nuremberg and at the ICTY/ICTR, to house 
the judicial and the prosecutorial body under the same roof, has regrettably 
been repeated. At Nuremberg and at the ICTY/ICTR, the affiliation between 
the judges and the prosecutor became a large issue and was therefore often 
subject to intense discussion, the ICC missed to circumvent this critical point. 
 
The most direct mechanism to trigger the investigative powers of the ICC is 
provided in Art. 13(b) of the statute, whereby a ‘situation’ is referred to the 
court by the SC acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charta. The same 
method applied to both ad hoc tribunals, by declaring the situations in the 
Balkans and Rwanda as a ‘situation’, threatening international peace and 
security. Therefore, there is no more need to establish another future ad hoc 
tribunal, if the veto-powers can agree on a referral to the ICC.10 In the event of 
disagreement, however, the situation becomes more complicated.11The court 
cannot acquire jurisdiction without a SC Resolution unless, the conduct in 
question occurred on the territory of a statute member or the suspect is a 
national of a state, which is a contracting party to the ICC statute. Both 
requirements were fulfilled in the case concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army 
in Uganda, but Uganda referred the situation to the ICC, a third mechanism to 
trigger the courts investigative powers. 
Lastly, the prosecutor may start investigating into a situation proprio motu 
(e.g. on his or her own initiative). But some legal hurdles remain in this path: A 
pre-trial chamber of the court has to revise and proof the evidence collected 
and has to authorize whether or not ‘the commencement of the investigations’ 
shall take place12. 
Furthermore, investigations proprio motu come with a number of 
disadvantaging features: 
In order to even commence investigations, the state concerned (or the 
national state of the accused) has to be contracting party to the court. 
Secondly, the prosecutor has to provide sufficient evidence to convince the 
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pre-trial chamber to authorize further proceedings. Thirdly, Art. 16. Of the 
Rome Statute provides for another hurdle to take:  
Art.16: ‘No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded 
with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in 
a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the 
Council under the same conditions.’ 
 
The SC thereby possesses the powers to stop any further investigations for a 
period of twelve months, renewable on an annual basis. The result of this 
mechanism, critics claim, might be that either the SC refers a situation to the 
court or simply tolerates the courts proceedings. This provision was included 
into the statute, although highly disputed amongst delegations in Rome, in 
order to keep the P5 aboard. It was clear from the very beginning of the 
negotiations for an international criminal court that the United States would 
not agree to a statute, which includes no cast-iron guarantee that no 
American would ever be indicted.13 
 
Art. 20 of the statute serves the principle of ‘ne bis in idem’ so that there can 
be no proceedings brought against a suspect before the ICC for conducts for 
which he/she has already been convicted or acquitted in national 
proceedings. However, this rule is subject to the qualification that the national 
proceedings have been carried out in accordance with international 
standards. If the proceedings were intended to shield the accused against 
ICC investigations, Art.20 does not take grip. Art.17 applies the same test for 
initial investigations. If a suspect is already being dealt with under national 
investigations, in a way, which appears genuine and effective, the ICC has to 
drop any further measures14. 
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8.3 Lessons learned from the ad hoc tribunals experience 
 
Fifteen years after the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, their work serve as a good and picturesque example 
of the tasks to come for the ICC. After having concluded more then 160 
proceedings against alleged perpetrators at The Hague and 21 completed 
trials in Arusha, the experience from those two tribunals is highly valuable for 
the ICC and its future proceedings. 
In the system designed for the ICC, states will have greater control over 
decisions where the dividing line should be drawn between the ICC’s 
jurisdiction and their own.15 This, according to Claude Jorda, will have a 
significant impact on the courts work. The disadvantage of a treaty-based 
court is the mere fact that all the contracting states have the power to change 
the rules in a General Assembly, according to the statute. This will indeed 
complicate the work of the court significantly.16 Still, the proceedings 
according to Art.13(b) of the statute will not be affected in this sense, since 
the SC can act irrespectively of individual states claims. Furthermore it 
remains yet to be seen, whether or not sate co-operation with the ICC will 
meet the high expectations of the international community. Although the 
acceptance of the court has been very positive it remains unclear, if the 
authority of the court will be enough to carry out effective investigations in 
situations of war and internal conflicts. 
Other issues, regarding lessons-learned from the ICTY experience, are far 
more clear. Some might be discussed here: 
The failure to complete investigations before indictments were issued for 
confirmation before the court, though understandable in the light of the early 
pressure to present results, resulted in the need for many amended 
indictments and a delay for proceedings at the ICTY. Furthermore, due to a 
bad co-operation amongst the separate investigative units of the ICTY, some 
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cases, which could have been resolved in one common trial, were carried out 
separately and therefore more cost and time intense.17 
Secondly, the importance of outreach and information provided to people in 
the former Yugoslavia was carried out too late in the ICTY history. The court 
had been operational for more then two years, before justice Kirk-McDonald 
initiated the Outreach Program in 1996.18 The ICC has to be aware of this 
issue and has to co-work closely with local authorities and NGO’s in the 
region to promote its values and ideas. A lack of regional support amongst the 
local population might hamper the investigative efforts of the ICC significantly 
and the utter importance of witness protection might be at stake as a result. 
Thirdly, the investigative-staff of the court needs to receive a special training 
and education dealing with traumative experiences of victims. Experiences at 
the ICTY and ICTR show that most of the staff was barely capable of dealing 
with the experiences they witnessed and heard themselves. 19 
Fourthly, the co-ordination amongst senior-staff members of all bodies of the 
court has to be enhanced in order to provide for more effective and shorter 
trials.20 
 
The experiences gathered from the ICTY and ICTR are highly valuable for 
future ICC proceedings. However, their tasks differ in many ways. Whilst the 
ICTY was eager to create an overall picture of the highly complex Balkan 
conflicts, with more than 15.000 alleged perpetrators and many situations to 
investigate, the ICC will per se focus on the ‘Big Fish’. This limited scope 
enables for the ICC to leaf many cases of low- and middle-ranking officials to 
national proceedings. The involvement of additional approaches, such as 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, will be crucial for the ICC to work 
effectively. It remains yet to be seen, how the Court can cope with this 
challenges. Furthermore, the prosecutor, when acting on his/her own motion 
(proprio motu) will face many difficulties regarding the enforcement of his/her 
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actions. The advantage of the ICTY, as already stated in the previous chapter, 
are the far reaching Chapter VII powers, endowed by the SC. The ICC will be 
equipped with those instruments in a very limited manner, namely only when 
carrying out proceedings pursuant to Art.13(b). 
 
 
8.4 Obstacles to overcome 
 
With the signing of the Rome Statute in July 1998, more then 120 nations 
agreed on the establishment of a permanent judicial body that is mend to deal 
with humanitarian issues, both globally and permanently. In April 2002, 60 
nations had ratified the statute, what finally put the court operational. 
Nevertheless, the court, from its very beginning, had to deal with several 
issues, which hamper its work. 
 
First of all, the ICC is not, as it was the initially proposed by some nations like 
Germany, an independent body, hence it is strongly bound to the co-operation 
with the UNSC and its permanent members, due to a compromise reached in 
Rome, to keep the United States on board during the negotiations21. 
Secondly, when the court finally began, to carry out its first investigations, the 
problem of state referrals (Art. 14 of the Rome Statute) became a major issue, 
especially regarding to the cases in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). Finally, the third major issue, in my opinion, was the abstention 
and ‘de-signing’ of the US to the statute in 2003.  
These three major problems are mend to be solved, in order to give the court 
its powers, to make it a court, worth the legacy of its predecessors, of both 
Nuremberg and the ICTY/ICTR. 
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8.4.1 A dual-court approach? 
 
After all, according to Art. 13, the Rome Statute provides three different ways, 
in triggering the ICC’s jurisdiction. First and foremost, the ICC has jurisdiction 
over the crimes defined in the Statute either committed by countries, which 
have ratified the Statute or if the crime is committed on the territory of a 
member state by a non-member state. 22 
Secondly, the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the Charta refers a situation 
to the ICC, even if the state concerned not being a member state of the 
Statute.23Thirdly, a state can, according to Art. 14 of the Statute refer itself to 
the courts jurisdiction. 
 
As it happened in 2004, the UNSC passed Resolution 1564 of 18. September 
2004, mandating the establishment of an ‘international commission of inquiry 
in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine 
also whether or not acts of Genocide have occurred, and to identify the 
perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible 
are held accountable’.24  
After the commission issued their report to the UNSC, it was decided, that the 
issue should be referred to the ICC for further inquisitions. Nevertheless, 
before that a different approach favoured by the United States and some 
African states was brought before the UNSC as well. The approach proposed 
the establishment of another ad hoc tribunal as a joint venture with the ICTR 
in Arusha, Tanzania. However, this approach was refused, due the bad 
experiences with such tribunals regarding to high costs and a slow response 
time.25 
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After a short period of investigation, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) came 
to the conclusion that there was enough evidence collected, to start further 
investigations and prepare first indictments.  
Nevertheless, the investigations in Darfur turned out being not as easy as 
expected. To start investigations in a region, where the conflict is still vividly 
capable, was a new challenge for the ICC. Neither was it easy to examine the 
witnesses, in order not to reveal their identity, which may have caused their 
death, nor was the support by the Sudanese authorities as big as expected.26  
However, within a short period of time, loads of documents were produced by 
the OTP, hundreds of witnesses were interviewed, so that the case could be 
presented to the pre-trial chamber of the court. 
The referral of the Darfur case to the ICC was as well a major breakthrough 
for the court supporters on the one hand, but it also held several advantages 
for the people concerned in the region: 
First of all, the members of the SC, who formerly opposed the jurisdiction of 
the ICC and displayed strong antagonism abstained the voting in the council 
and gave the court an opportunity to act. 
Secondly, the ICC acting on behalf of the UNSC under a Chapter VII 
resolution gives wide-ranging powers to the OTP. The court’s actions would 
be backed up by all Chapter VII mechanisms and could be triggered more 
easily. 
Thirdly, the court and the UNSC drew an outstanding link between peace 
building and justice, by showing that peace could be brought to a region by 
holding perpetrators accountable for atrocities committed.27  
Soon after the case was issued before the court, a list of accused persons 
was produced. 
 
However, the UNSC referral is not as convenient for the ICC as it appears on 
the first sight. Resolution 1593 contained several points, which seemed to 
expend the interpretation of the Rome Statute to the outmost. 
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First of all, the funding of the case was, contrary to Art. 115 (b) of the Statute, 
led to the ICC. The UNSC refused to bear the costs for as well the 
investigations and the trial. This brought a huge burden to the Court and 
especially to the OTP, which had to raise funding for this case at the State 
Assembly of the ICC. Remarkably, the expenses of the two ad hoc tribunals in 
The Hague and Arusha are paid by the UN, according to Art.32 of the 
Statute.28 However, the reason that the Darfur case was not funded by the 
UNSC, emerged from a wide compromise, necessary for the United States to 
acquiescence the voting.29 
The funding issue brings up the question, whether or not the court, when 
acting on behalf of the UNSC, creates a different regime, as when acting on 
its own investigations.30  
Secondly, the UNSC in its mandate made wide-ranging exceptions for the 
OTP’s competences.  As the resolution points out: 
‘Nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State 
outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing 
State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in 
Sudan established by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive 
jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing State’.31 
 
This part of the resolution is especially ‘unfortunate’ for several reasons. First 
and foremost, the UNSC shaped the case for the OTP and its investigating 
powers. However, it is within the competence of the UNSC to refer cases to 
the ICC, but the Statute in Art.13 (b) literally refers to ‘situations’ and not 
single cases32. So, in my opinion, the UNSC exaggerates its powers, by pre-
defining the filed of operation for the OTP ex ante. The competences of the 
OTP in this regard should remain untouched to keep the courts independence 
beyond any doubt.  
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Secondly, it is highly doubtful whether to make judicial exceptions for non-
party state peacekeepers inter alia is lawful under the regime of the Rome 
Statute, since it is not provided for in the ICC statute.33 
 
However, these two facts, the funding and the shaping of the investigations ex 
ante, might bring one to the conclusion that depending on whether or not the 
court is acting on behalf of the UNSC or on its own initiative, two different 
‘Courts’ appear. As Ohlin points out, the Court is best viewed as two courts: 
“an independent criminal court enacted by the parties of the Rome Statute 
but, in the case of referrals by the Security Council under Article 13(b) of the 
Statute, an organ for restoring collective peace and security that transcends 
the classic goals of criminal law to adjudicate individual guilt”34. 
 
 
8.4.2 The United States and the ICC  
 
The second main problem, the ICC has to deal with, is the abstention of the 
U.S to the Rome Statute. In 1998 in Rome, during the last round of 
negotiations, it was not as clear, as it appears today, that the U.S would 
refuse from joining the courts jurisdiction. However, during the negotiations, 
two strong groups of states emerged, who promoted different ideas, of how 
the court should be established. One, the more ‘like-minded’ group, led by 
Germany and France, preferred a court genuinely independent from the 
UNSC with a strong prosecutor. Nevertheless, the U.S also wanted a court, 
but one under the control of the UNSC; literally one, that would never work 
against the interests of the U.S. The model preferred by the U.S and Canada 
was one under the control of the Security Council, where a veto of the 
permanent members could block investigations.35 
Throughout the whole negotiations, efforts were made to keep the U.S 
aboard. Lots of these efforts are still likely to see in the current statute, even 
though the U.S refused to join, like Art.16 of the Statute.  
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The main reason for states such as France and Germany to refuse the U.S 
proposal was that, if the UNSC could block or even stop investigations from 
its very beginning, permanent members of the UNSC could always protect 
their allies, and therefore impunity would still be an issue, even more likely 
then it was before. 
The Bush jr. administration, following the Clinton administration, which had 
actually signed the Rome Statute, ‘unsigned’ the statute in 2002 and the ‘the 
Hague Invasion-Act’36 was introduced, which actually allowed the president to 
give order to free American service staff members, which are held in custody 
by the ICC, to be freed, even with military force, without permission of the 
congress, what underlined the strong opposition the U.S had against the 
court. 
 
But still the question remains, what causes the strong opposition of the U.S 
towards the ICC? 
To say it in Bill Clinton’s words: It’s all about sovereignty, stupid! The United 
States, as the only remaining Super-Power after the cold war, with hundreds 
of thousand of military and non-military service members spread all over the 
world, has a particularly strong interest in not loosing any of their sovereignty, 
by letting a court rule about the actual legitimacy of their work. In his 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 23 July 1998, 
David Scheffer, US ambassador at large for war crimes issues, stated that the 
establishment of the court could ‘inhibit the ability of the United States to use 
its military to meet alliance obligations and participate in multilateral 
operations, including humanitarian interventions to save Civilian live’.37 
However, this argument is, as Robertson argues, complete nonsense, due to 
the complementarity mechanism provided in the Rome Statute, which enables 
member states to deal with occurring human rights violations at the first hand, 
before the ICC actually steps in.38 
Furthermore, as the number of ratifications increased (and so did the 
concerns of the U.S about its nationals being arrested on foreign territory, 
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according to the territorial principle in the statute) the U.S started rapidly to 
negotiate bilateral Art.98(2) agreements with party states. Those agreements 
basically include non-surrender agreements of U.S citizens to the court. 
Art.98(2) of the Rome Statute prevents the ICC from insisting on the 
extradition of its suspect, if that would put the extraditing state in breach of a 
treaty obligation to a third state. The provision was intentionally used to 
protect diplomats and was never mend to establish a back door through which 
state parties, under the pressure of the U.S, sign a bilateral agreement not to 
surrender their nationals.39 
 
 
8.4.3 ‘Self-referrals’ – a double track approach toward justice? 
 
The first two cases brought before the ICC in early 2004, the situation in 
Uganda (referred to the ICC on 29 January 2004) and in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (referred on 19 April 2004), were based on self-referrals by 
Uganda and the DRC.40 
A third referral by the by the Central African Republic was issued in 2005. The 
common feature of all these cases lies in the fact that all three conflicts are 
wholly internal. However, a second common feature is the fact that the self-
referral was always issued by the government fighting against rebel groups. In 
all three cases, the OTP was asked to start investigations on crimes alleged 
by the rebel groups fighting against the central authorities. 
However, self-referrals hold a lot of advantages for the OTP, concerning the 
assured co-operation of the state authorities, hence they have a special 
interest in trying those alleged persons.41 Nevertheless, it must be borne in 
mind, that the state authorities are as involved in the armed conflict as the 
rebel groups and are therefore likely to commit the same atrocities, as the 
rebel groups. 42 
However, the Prosecutor has wisely stated, that once he investigates in a 
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‘situation’, he will do so across the board and not just looking for the crimes 
committed by the various rebel groups.43 
Nevertheless, a question mark must be put along the habitus of states, 
referring their internal conflicts to the ICC. Some concerns might be issued: 
First of all, the state authorities, by referring the case to the ICC, denounce 
the rebel groups as international criminals.  This might open the way to fight 
those alleged perpetrators in a more cruel way then the authorities would 
have done initially, without international back up. 
Secondly, it must be born in mind that the self-referral and the waiver on 
complementarity by the party, intentionally is just issued on crimes committed 
by the rebel groups and not by the state authorities. For crimes committed by 
the state, the ICC should have no competence, hence the authorities would 
investigate in those cases themselves. 
Thirdly, Art.14 of the Statute, which deals with self-referrals, was intentionally 
meant for war-torn states with a lack of competence to start investigations. As 
it is clear form the sixth preambular paragraph of the Statute, every state has 
‘the duty…to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes’. 44 
 
The foundation of the International Criminal court in 1998 and its birth in 2002 
mark a significant step in international law to make the impunity of grave 
breaches in international criminal law history. Nevertheless, the ICC is still 
struggling with problems, in order to establish a working regime of global 
justice. As I tried to point out, the obstacles for the ICC are less according to 
its function, then more according to its novelty in the international arena. 
First, the problems that the ICC is facing due to the abstention on the U.S are 
not new. In 1982, during the last round of negotiations for a new international 
high-seas regime (UNCLOS II), the U.S finally refused to sign the new treaty, 
even though they were a strong supporter of the initial idea. However, several 
years later, after a new round of negotiations and an intense revision of the 
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critical chapters, the U.S finally joined the convention.45 The lessons learned 
from this must be, that it is not the end of the day yet!  
Secondly, according to the UNSC issue: The court is obviously highly 
depending on a strong cooperation with the SC and its veto-powers. 
Nevertheless it must be borne in mind, that the Chapter VII resolutions, on 
which the Darfur referral was build up, constitutes the strongest legal 
mechanism within the international peacekeeping regime. However, the 
UNSC should not abuse these powers by watering down the Rome Statute.  
Thirdly, the self-referral cases in Uganda and the DRC gave the ICC a great 
opportunity to gain both, international awareness and a first chance to proof 
its ability. However, the ongoing Lubanga Case might have the same effect as 
the Tadic case had for the ICTY. Back in the days, the ICTY was struggling 
with major problems of integrity, but the Tadic case marked a turning point for 
the tribunal, by showing its effectiveness46. Maybe the Lubanga case can do 
the same for the ICC. 
 
 
8.5 The International Criminal Court and the Promotion of Justice 
 
Huge expectations rest on the shoulders of the ICC from its early stage on. 
Human Rights groups as well as national states and the international 
community have large expectations for the court to stop a regime of impunity, 
which was predominate in the last century. It is expected that the ICC will 
contribute towards a climate of accountability not only through the 
demonstrative effect of its own prosecution but through its complementarity 
jurisdiction.47This approach was meant to encourage national states to carry 
out investigations on a domestic level, before the ICC, due to Art.17 of the 
Statute, would step in. However, even during the negotiations at Rome one 
issue was discussed vividly. How should the ICC be embedded in the concept 
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of Transitional Justice? 
As Boraine held:’ It is to be hoped…that when the International Criminal Court 
comes into being, it will not, either by definition or by approach, discourage 
attempts by national states to come to terms with their past…It would be 
regrettable if the only approach to gross human rights violations comes in the 
form of trials and punishment. Every attempt should be made to assist 
countries to find their own solutions provided that there is no blatant disregard 
of fundamental human rights’.48 
Many authors have argued that there should be some discretion for the ICC 
included in the statute, in order to give way for alternative judicial and non-
judicial remedies in times of transition of states from turmoil into 
democracies.49 
But at a time, when it was hard to predict when and how effectively the court 
would come into being, it was even more difficult to see, how it would interact 
with quasi-judicial approaches. At the first hand, the very purpose of the ICC 
is to ensure to carry out investigations and prosecutions against the most 
serious offences, and to prompt national states to overthrow the 
considerations of expedience and realpolitik that had so often led to trade of 
justice for impunity and peace. 
The drafters of the Rome Statute chose wisely not to dig too deep into these 
critical issues, because it was rather unlikely to reach a consensus amongst 
the state-parties on this topic. However, the drafters of the statute agreed on 
including a clause into the actual treaty, which would left the door open for 
alternative forms of justice. The most likely mechanism at which the ICC will 
decide whether to defer to quasi-judicial mechanisms and national programs 
is pursuant to the discretion of the prosecutor to abstain from prosecution ‘in 
the interest of justice’, as stated in Art.53 of the statute.50  
The basic argument for this interpretation of Art.53 is that the ICC basically 
must initiate investigations in a certain situations, if the relevant conditions are 
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met. However, under exceptional circumstances and where it would not be in 
the interests of justice to interfere with reconciliation mechanisms, the ICC 
can refuse to initiate proceedings. Especially in cases, where lower level 
offenders would fall under the jurisdiction of a truth and reconciliation 
commission, or where they were even granted amnesties, combined with 
judicial prosecutions of senior offenders, the ICC is likely to hamper the 
reconciling process. However in cases, where even high-ranking offenders 
would be granted amnesties, the ICC must step in.51 This assumption derives 
from the mere fact that blanked amnesties would actually establish an anti-
thesis towards the purpose of the ICC. 
It must be stated at the outset that there is no contradiction or inherent 
hostility between the objectives of the ICC and truth and reconciliation 
commissions. Truth commissions may add a valuable part to the 
investigations of a criminal proceeding. Furthermore, compared to the highly 
formalized proceedings of criminal trials and investigations, truth commissions 
may establish a welcome alternative, especially in terms of to victim’s rights. 
Furthermore, they may complement the work of a judicial tribunal by 
facilitating compensations for victims, educating the public, promote 
reconciliation and by making recommendations for the future.52 
Thus, trial prosecution and truth commissions serve valuable objectives, 
which are not inherently in conflict. The very problem, indeed, occurs, where 
blanked amnesties were handed out. The raison d’etre of the ICC is to not let 
go serious international crimes unpunished.53 
 
8.5.1 Discretion not to Proceed: In the Interests of Justice 
 
Art.53(1) of the ICC statute governs the discretion of the prosecutor, whether 
to launch investigations after the jurisdiction has been triggered either by a 
state referral or a SC referral, or not.  Furthermore, Art.(53) provides that the 
prosecutor shall launch proceedings unless there is ‘no reasonable basis’ to 
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proceed. More specifically, the Statute in Art.53(1)c requires the prosecutor to 
take ‘… into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there 
are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not 
serve the interests of justice.’  
 
But the decision of the prosecutor to initiate proceedings, if considered 
reasonable, is by itself subject to supervision of the Pre-Trial chamber, 
according to the rules of procedure and evidence. Only if the Pre-Trial 
chamber agrees with the conclusions of the prosecutor, investigations are due 
to take action. In cases, however, where the prosecutor concludes not to start 
investigations, the Pre-Trial chamber may only ask him to re-consider his 
decision, according to Art.53(3)a of the statute.  
The fundamental question however, remains whether the merits of ‘interest of 
justice’ only applies to criminal justice or to a broader definition of justice alike. 
Interpreting the provision in the context of the whole statue, the only 
supportable interpretation seems to be the latter.54 Art.53(2)c specifically 
states that the prosecutor may take broader factors, including compassionate 
considerations such as the age of the accused or the gravity of the crime and 
the interests of the victims, into account. Thus, the discretion of Art.53 has to 
be interpreted broadly. 
This interpretation is furthermore in conformity with the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Art. 31 of the VCLT states that the interpretation 
of a treaty shall be conducted ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose’. It clearly follows from the preamble text of the ICC 
statute that the ICC should serve as a last resort against impunity and that 
other measures to deal with large-scale atrocities should be taken into 
account as well. This could denote an intention to allow ‘the interest of justice’ 
to encompass wide-ranging considerations not relating directly to a criminal 
trial.55 It might nevertheless be surprising, however, that human right groups, 
such as Amnesty International or Human Right Watch, prefer a rather narrow 
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interpretation of Art.53. Their basic assumption is, bearing in mind the 
preamble of the Rome Statute, that justice is always served by prosecuting 
crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction.56 
It was furthermore argued that the ICC’s raison d’etre is to prosecute and 
punish serious international crimes and that the court constitutes a safeguard 
against impunity. Even further, it can be assumed that the SC, according to 
Art.16 of the statute, has the power to stop any investigations, if it appears 
clear that alternative approaches would have a wider and more effective 
influence on the situation at hands.  
 
8.5.2 The Obligation to Prosecute and the Legality of Amnesties 
 
There has been an ongoing discussion throughout recent years, if there is an 
obligation under international law to prosecute certain crimes. This debate 
was again initiated parallel to the ongoing discussion of discretion, regarding 
Art.53 of the ICC statute. Neither international customary rules nor 
international general principles oblige states to exercise jurisdiction over 
international crimes. Antonio Cassese, former president of the ICTY, however, 
believes that it is possible to argue that ‘in those areas where treaties provide 
for such an obligation, a corresponding customary rule may have emerged or 
be in the process of evolving’.57 
 
International Conventions, such as the 1948 Geneva Conventions, provide for 
the legal basis of jurisdiction to punish certain crimes. But do they furthermore 
include obligations in this respect? The Geneva Conventions, for example, 
stipulate that persons guilty of genocide shall be punished and state parties 
must enact the necessary legislation and provide for effective remedies.58  
Those provisions are subject to international custom and are binding amongst 
states, even without a conventional treaty basis. Therefore it appears clear 
that for the crime of genocide that an inter-state obligation to prosecute 
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genocide exists, endorsed by conventional and custom law.59 
The same might apply for war crimes and crimes against humanity, even 
though the obligation to prosecute might arise from a different legal source. 
For crimes against humanity several multilateral treaties exist, which enshrine 
that those crimes should not go unpunished. However, the general 
acceptance of these treaties is not comparable to the Genocide Convention. It 
is therefore difficult to argue that the same obligation applies to war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, as it does regarding to genocide.60  But it is 
indeed crucial for the deterrence of future atrocities that those most heinous 
crimes do not go un-punished. 
  
The granting of impunity and the non-prosecution of those crimes would send 
a wrong signal to other regimes, which might continue their vicious policy. The 
more distinct the international community confronts regimes with their 
wrongdoings and the more stringent the policy of prosecution is set forth, the 
harder it is for criminal regimes to believe that they will enjoy impunity for their 
acts.61 
Even in the event that truth and reconciliation commissions have been 
established to shed light on past atrocities, the natural need for justice should 
not be underestimated. Human rights and victims groups have thus vigorously 
pushed for justice even in the event of the establishment of non-judicial 
bodies.  
 
8.5.3 The Legality of Amnesties 
 
It was common practice in several post-conflict societies to grant wide-ranging 
amnesties for alleged perpetrators in order to bargain a peace accord. This 
practice was very often subject to long discussions and shall just be 
discussed in the following very briefly. 
An overall obligation to prosecute certain crimes under international law would 
introduce a full-ban on granting amnesties in times of transition. Although 
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bases for amnesties exist under international law, they never went without 
discussion. Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions in Art.6(5) 
provides for such an amnesty clause. At the same time, however, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) urges for a rather narrow 
interpretation of this provision, since the overall intend of the protocol calls for 
the protection of victims. 62 The ICRC notes that international humanitarian 
law does not exclude amnesties as long as ‘the principle that those having 
committed grave breaches have to be either prosecuted or extradited is not 
voided of its substance’.63 
Recent developments in this field furthermore proof a shift in policy regarding 
the granting of general amnesties. As a good example for this development 
serves the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), established under UN 
mandate in 2000 after several years of a raging war between rebel groups 
and state authorities in Sierra Leone. In a peace accord between the rebel 
groups and the authorities of Sierra Leone an amnesty clause was included in 
the treaty for most of the rebel leaders. The UN, however, declared that these 
amnesties should not include prosecutions in relation to genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. Subsequently, in Art.10 of the statute of the SCSL the UN 
repeated this provision. Art.10 provides:  
‘An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special 
Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present 
Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.’ 
 
But, as already discussed in the previous chapters, such amnesty should be 
granted to minor offenders in order to support the process of national healing. 
This issue, however, is unlikely to appear in the case of the ICC, since its 
jurisdiction inter alia will mainly focus on the key perpetrators. On a moral 
level, there is a significant difference between the situation of low-level 
perpetrators and those who orchestrate the crime. There is indeed a greater 
case for deference to the judgment of a democratic society as to how to deal 
with those individuals who were manipulated by propaganda and swept up in 
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a fleet of evil.64 For those offenders, one can easily imagine the value of 
sincere forgiveness and reconciliation. The situation for those persons most 
responsible for serious crimes, however, is rather different. For those 
architects of genocide and war crimes the granting of amnesties is utterly 
problematic. Those individuals may be responsible for the death of maybe 
hundreds or thousands of civilians. To let them go un-punished would 
essentially disturb the relation between the authorities and the victims. It is 
therefore crucial for victims to see their perpetrator tried, in order to uphold the 
importance of basic common values and to send a message of deterrence to 
other potential perpetrators. 
 
Thus, during recent years a general assumption of illegality of amnesties for 
the most serious crimes seems to have appeared.  However, as Cassese 
notes, ‘a general obligation for states to refrain from enacting amnesty laws’ 
has yet to occur and is not supported by current state practise.65 
 
 
8.6 Genuine Proceedings 
 
The principle of complementarity, embedded in Art.17 of the ICC statute, 
provides for national states to indicate proceedings at first hands, before the 
ICC steps in. A case at the ICC would be declared inadmissible, if genuine 
national proceedings take place and the state decides to investigate into a 
certain matter. 
During the ongoing negotiations in Rome in 1998, some delegations (most 
notably the delegation of South Africa) sought to explicitly recognize Truth and 
Reconciliation commissions in Art.17. The majority of states, as well as most 
of the NGO’s, however, refused to endorse this attempt. Most of the states 
opted for the view that Art.17, in correlation with Art.20 (ne bis in idem), only 
applies to trial proceedings.66 
One of the very first questions regarding Art.17 of the statute was concerning 
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the interpretation of the term ‘investigation’. What kind of investigations has to 
be carried out in order not to trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction? The court would 
clearly interpret the term as criminal investigations.67 Other interpretations of 
the term investigations would provide for investigations of a truth and 
reconciliation commission as well, if the definition comprises a diligent and 
methodical effort to gather information and evidence and ascertain the facts of 
the conduct in question. The definition of Art.17 regarding the terms ‘unable or 
unwilling’ in relation to national prosecution does not come into play here. 
However, the point raised by the RSA delegation opens a significant issue, of 
how the ICC will co-operate cope with truth and reconciliation commissions 
and how common efforts could be carried out, according to the ICC statute. 
 
 
8.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
The ICC has yet to proof, how it will cope with mass atrocities. So forth, the 
only cases pending at the moment derived from state referrals and can 
therefore not be seen as genuine prosecutions of the court. Even though a 
sharp compromise between national states, NGO’s and other institutions has 
been stroke in Rome in 1998, many issues, such as the interpretation of 
Art.17, 20 and 16, remain unresolved and will be subject to discussions for 
years to come. 
In an interview, conducted in Vienna early in 2009, I had the opportunity to 
speak with Manfred Novak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Director of 
the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Human Rights, about his expectations on 
the future of the ICC.68 In his view, the future for the ICC will be brighter than 
most of his colleges would assume. He strongly supports the idea that the 
ICC will lead to an end of impunity for serious human rights violations. Antonio 
Cassese once described the ICTY as a ‘giant without arms and legs’.69He 
referred to the ICTY in this respect, due to the lack of co-operation of states 
involved in proceedings with the court. Up to date, it is unpredictable how this 
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situation will affect the ICC. First of all, it depends on the way, how the ICC 
proceedings are carried out. If they are conducted in accordance with a SC 
referral, the SC can endow the ICC with all necessary powers to initiate and 
carry out effective proceedings. A rather different picture might appear in the 
case that the prosecutor acts in his/her own capacity proprio motu.  
In cases of self-referrals of states, the co-operation should be based on a 
wide-ranging confidence between the ICC and the state in conduct, in order to 
provide for a rapid advancement of the investigations. Since the ratifying 
process amongst states, which can clearly be held as the leaders of human 
rights abuses, is still rather poor, a lot of work needs to be done to create an 
overall and global regime of justice and accountability. 
In order to establish this global regime, some considerations might be taken 
into account. As Wayne Sandholtz notes, there are several factors, which may 
lead to the adoption or refusal of the ICC jurisdiction70:  
• Major military powers will be less favourable to the ICC, preferring to 
avoid any potential interference with the use of force internationally 
(realism). 
• Democracies will be more favourable to participation in the ICC, 
accepting the international application of rule-of-law and human rights 
values they embrace at home. 
• States already embedded in regional systems with functioning 
supranational courts (the EU, the ECHR, possibly the ACHR) will be 
more likely to join the ICC because they have already made and 
adapted to similar grants of supranational authority. 
• An additional hypothesis suggests that states that provide large 
numbers of troops for U.N. operations will not be enthusiastic about the 
ICC because their personnel would offer more potential targets for 
prosecution.  
 
Those assumptions are obviously hard to deny but also do not go far enough. 
His findings do not take into consideration the enormous pressure states may 
                                                
70
 Sandhotz, Wayne: Europe, America and the International Court; accessible under: 
http://www.princeton.edu/~hmilner/Conference_files/Transatlantic/Abstract-Sandholtz.pdf. (Feb.02 
2009) 
 
-109- 
 
 
face, if they do not join the regime. Russia, for example, joined the Council of 
Europe and the ECHR jurisdiction in May 1998. Prior to this, nobody would 
have expected to see Russia joining this regime. Since that time, an 
enormous caseload has been produced by the court, involving Russian 
plaintiffs and human right standards had been held high in Russia, compared 
to the prior state. Nowadays, almost one third of the cases referred to the 
Strasbourg court comes from Russia. This development shows, how 
significant such regimes can be and how they can be used to promote 
international human right standards. 
One can only hope that the success of the European Court of Human Rights 
serves as a good example for the ICC. 
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9. Conclusion and Findings 
 
 
As I tried to point out in the previous chapters, the impact of judicial bodies on 
post conflict societies is sometimes hard to evaluate and depends on a variety 
of factors. 
Most notably is the perception of a court’s work in the region concerned and 
amongst the affected population. Regrettably, this aspect was not considered 
during the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. For the work of the ICTY it can be 
held that the Outreach Program, aimed to distribute information of the court’s 
work in the Balkans, came too late. This specific approach of the ICTY 
enables for the local population to get informed about the work of the tribunal. 
The program was designed to ‘provide a comprehensive proactive information 
campaign stressing the Tribunal’s impartiality and independence, as well as 
countering the endemic misconceptions that had prompted widespread 
disillusionment with the Tribunal in the former Yugoslavia’.1 Since the launch 
of this program, the degree of information about the courts work has risen 
significantly and therefore supported more moderate political parties in 
countries, such as Serbia, Croatia and the Kosovo. For the ICC it remains yet 
to be seen, how the court will cope with this issue, but one can hope that it will 
learn from the mistakes of its predecessors. A strong engagement, however, 
between the ICC and NGOs and the civil society is vital for its future success 
and its perception. 
Secondly, victims and witnesses have to be protected in a manner by the 
court that if they testify before the bench, the infliction of harm after their 
return to their homes has to be prevented. 
Thirdly, the court has to be supported by an efficient and distinct work of 
forces in the ground. The ICC and the ICTY both have to deal and struggle 
with this issue. The international community therefore has to provide for a 
sufficient support in this respect. 
Fourthly, judicial bodies must not be used as political instruments. Their 
independence and impartiality has to be immanent beyond reasonable doubt 
                                                
1
 Humphrey, Michel: International Intervention, Justice and National Reconciliation: The Role of the 
ICTY and ICTR in Bosnia and Rwanda in Journal of Human Rights; p.495-505; Vol.2; 2003; p.1 
 -111- 
in order to gain credibility amongst the affected population and states. This 
factor does not just apply to judicial institutions but to non-judicial institutions, 
such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions alike. 
Lastly, judicial institutions have to be used in combination with a variety of 
measures, such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, retributive aims 
and social work, especially by engaging the civil society. Their work has to be 
seen as complimentary to non-judicial mechanisms, and vice-versa. It must 
be noted that several commissions have been set up in countries all over the 
world and have produced credible and important facts. Supplemented by the 
work of a numerous number of NGO’s, their work has proved to be highly 
valuable and important to accomplish the overall goal of reconciliation 
amongst ethnic groups.  
 
The importance of the legal bodies in the concept of transitional justice is their 
institutionalized status; the work accomplished by a structure of laws cannot 
be accomplished by a structure of sentiments.2 Politically, it is the task of the 
state to recover the status of a victim. International law, in this respect, 
provides this recovery for a victim against a state. Usually, state violence does 
not violate the rights of a single person more then compared to a normal 
criminal offence, but as representatives of a particular social or ethnic group, 
state crimes do stigmatize the whole ethnic or religious entity. By identifying 
those offences, international law helps to identify and remedy those stigmas.  
But in a conflict as complex as the one in the Balkans, it is often unclear to 
determine distinctly, who the key perpetrators were. Given the sheer 
enormous amount of persons, who were involved in criminal conducts in the 
Balkans, it is obvious to see that one international court cannot deal with all 
these cases. International criminal prosecution therefore must not claim to 
deal with every single case, but to break ground for subsequent cases to be 
dealt with either through national judicial systems or non-judicial mechanisms. 
Without penalizing gross human rights violations reconciliation may be 
doomed to failure. The assumption that justice was directly linked to long-
lasting peace, was crucial for the creation of the ICTY and influenced from the 
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experience of the Nuremberg legacy, which helped to turn post-Nazi Germany 
into a sustainable democracy.  
This direct link between justice, peace and reconciliation has to be recognized 
and used wisely in order to ensure the success of future courts and tribunals. 
It remains yet to see hoe the ICC will integrate into the concept of transitional 
justice, but a sound basis for upcoming success has to be laid down in Rome 
in 1998. A strong signal has to be sent out to criminal regimes all over the 
world that their wrongdoings and their most heinous crimes will not go 
unpunished. For the local population indeed the removal of some key political 
figures from their position, is one of the most significant effects of an 
international criminal court. As Payman Akhavan states: ‘…the removal of 
leaders with criminal dispositions and a vested interest in conflict makes a 
positive contribution to post-conflict peace building. In concert with other 
policy measures, resort to international criminal tribunals can play a significant 
role in discrediting and containing destabilizing political forces. Stigmatizing 
delinquent leaders through indictment, as well as apprehension and 
prosecution, undermines their influence. Even if wartime leaders still enjoy 
popular support among an indoctrinated public at home, exclusion from the 
international sphere can significantly impede their long-term exercise of 
power.’3 
However, the vacuum left after the removal of the political elite, has to be filled 
in order to guarantee the further development of a transitional society. 
Therefore, judicial remedies always have to go hand in hand with political and 
administrative approaches.  
 
It remains yet to be seen, how future generations will judge the work of the 
contemporary tribunals and it is yet to be seen, how the ICC will cope with the 
tasks ahead. However, the plain establishment of these judicial bodies can on 
its own be seen as truly remarkable and groundbreaking. Some years ago this 
development would not have been foreseeable and many cynics would have 
denied these evolvements. The international community has to furthermore 
commit itself to these approaches in order to once reach the point in history, 
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where judicial institutions have the powers to ensure the enforcement of basic 
human rights on a global scale and where gross human rights violations 
would never go unpunished again. 
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Abstract: 
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals in the Concept of 
Transitional Justice and their Impact on Post-Conflict Societies 
  
In meiner Diplomarbeit versuchte ich zu evaluieren, welche 
messbaren Auswirkungen internationale Strafgerichtshöfe auf post-Konflikt 
Gesellschaften haben. Aus diesem Grund habe ich drei verschieden-
konzepierte Tribunale und Gerichte (Nürnberger Prozesse, Jugoslawien 
Tribunal und Internationaler Strafgerichtshof) auf Arbeitsweise, rechtliche 
Hintergründe und politische Aspekte hin untersucht. 
Diese drei verschiedene Gerichtshöfe, ein Sieger-Tribunal, ein ad hoc 
Tribunal und ein vertragsbasierter permanenter Gerichtshof, unterscheiden 
sich deutlich in vielerlei Hinsicht, verfolgen allerdings das gleich Ziel – 
rechtliche Verantwortlichkeit für Kriegsverbrecher und Konfliktbewältigung. 
Durch das verstärkte Auftreten solcher Strafgerichte und Tribunale in vielen 
Konfliktgebieten weltweit seit der frühen 1990er Jahre, gelangten diese immer 
mehr in den Fokus der internationalen Gemeinschaft. 
Die Etablierung des Jugoslawien-Tribunals in Den Haag im Jahre 1993 kann 
in dieser Hinsicht als wegweisend und bahnbrechend gesehen werden. Zum 
ersten mal seit den Nürnberger Prozessen, die in den Jahren nach dem 
zweiten Weltkrieg in Deutschland abgehalten wurden, wurden mutmaßliche 
Kriegsverbrecher vor Gericht für ihre Taten zur Verantwortung gezogen. Die 
Auswirkungen der Urteile, sowohl von Nürnberg als auch von Den Haag, 
haben seither signifikant die Nachkriegsgesellschaft in den jeweiligen 
Regionen beeinflusst. 
Wo sich in dieser Tradition von Gerichtshöfen der erste globale und 
permanente Akteur, der 1999 geschaffene Internationale Strafgerichtshof 
(IStGh), einordnen wird ist nichtsdestoweniger durchaus fraglich. Der IStGH 
als vertragsbasierter Gerichtshof steht vor grossen Herausforderungen. Nicht 
nur, dass dem Gericht die Kapitel VII Kräfte der UN Charta fehlen, wie sie 
das Jugoslawien Tribunal besitzt, auch fehlt eine 
breite Unterstützung der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft. 
Nichtsdestoweniger war die Etablierung des IStGH ein wichtiger Schritt in 
Richtung Konfliktbewältigung und ‘Post-Conflict Peace Building’. Wo diese 
Entwicklung jedoch münden wird, ist schwer vorhersehbar. 
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